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INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, the number of cases filed in
federal courts has expanded dramatically. This increase has
had little impact on the workload of the Supreme Court, which
in its most recent term decided fewer cases on the merits than
it did in 1960.' It has, however, transformed the workings of
the federal district courts and courts of appeals. Perhaps most
obviously, the federal bench, both district and appellate, has
grown as its caseload has expanded, although the former
growth has not matched the latter. Congress has created hun-
dreds of new district and circuit judgeships2 and carved new
judicial districts and circuits out of the existing structure,3 and
yet relative caseloads still hit new highs each year.4 Put sim-
1 See Linda Greenhouse, Split Decisions; The Court Rules, America Changes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at 1 ("During the [October 1999] term .... the Court
decided only 73 cases, the fewest number of any term since the early 1950's".); see
also Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure,
60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029, 1031, 1034-36 (1999) (detailing that "the courts of ap-
peals continue to generate an ever-increasing volume of decisions . . . [while] the
[Supreme] Court's docket of argued cases has shrunk to levels not seen since the
1950s"). The Supreme Court has faced some additional burdens from the increased
federal caseload through a large increase in the number of petitions for certiorari.
See generally David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, The Rule Of Four, The Cert. Pool,
And The Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997)
(discussing modem growth in the volume of certiorari petitions and the Supreme
Court's response).
2 Since 1950, the number of authorized district judgeships has grown from 212
to 646, and the number of circuit judgeships has grown from 75 to 179. See
COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL
REPORT 14 & tbl. 2-3 (1998) (reporting data which includes, in 1950, judges from
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Court of Claims and which in-
cludes, today, judges from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) [hereinaf-
ter WHITE COMMsN REPORT].
' In the best-known example, the Fifth Circuit was split in 1980 in recognition
of the increased caseload in the southeastern United States. See generally
DEBORAH J. BARRow & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH CIR-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988). Proposals
continue to be debated for a similar split in the Ninth Circuit because of the large
size and large caseload of that court. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The
Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal To Restructure The Ninth Circuit,
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 377 (2000); Symposium: The Proposal to Split the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, 57 MONT. L. REV. 241 (1996). At the district court level, too,
new districts have been created in many states. See Judicial Conference of the
United States, History of Federal Judgeships, at http/www.uscourts.gov/history/-
district.html (visited Sept. 6, 2000).
' See Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of
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ply, the map and the moil of the federal judiciary is not what it
was in the days of the Warren Court.
The practices of the lower federal courts have also
changed, particularly operations in the courts of appeals. With
a much smaller caseload, decision-making in the federal circuit
courts could reasonably aspire to what has been described as
"the Learned Hand model--a model in which cases are decid-
ed by a panel of collegial judges, following full briefing and oral
argument, through a published opinion crafted by one of the
judges after receiving considerable input from other circuit
judges.5 But while many still long for this idealized model of
appellate decision-making, there is no doubt that the modern
courts of appeals cannot and do not operate in this manner (to
the extent that they ever did so). In order to deal with the
massive increase in the judicial caseload, the modern court of
appeals not only has more judges than it did forty years ago,
but also more law clerks and substantially more administra-
tive and legal staff, all of whom have a hand in appellate adju-
dications.' Judges, of course, retain final decision-making au-
thority, but in practice, staff attorneys and law clerks influence
both the decision-making process and often its outcomes. More-
over, the growing caseload has not only restructured the per-
sonnel involved in the federal appellate process, it has also
brought dramatic changes in both the input to, and output
from, the courts of appeals. Litigants' opportunities to submit
briefs and to make oral arguments to the courts of appeals
have been curtailed, while the circuit courts have come to
dispose of a majority of cases through unpublished opinions.7
the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 26 (noting that, despite increases in the
number of federal judges, "filings per judgeship have continued to rise in both the
district courts and the courts of appeals"); see also WHITE COMM'N REPORT, supra
note 2, at 14 & tbl. 2-3 (detailing that near tripling of the number of federal judg-
es since 1950 has not kept pace with escalating filings in the federal courts, espe-
cially in the courts of appeals).
' See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
273, 278 (1996) (describing the "traditional appellate procedure" and terming it
"the Learned Hand model"); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Bureaucracy
Seriously, 99 HARV. L. REV. 344, 345, 356-58 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)) (discussing the tradi-
tional approach to appeals in terms of the "Hart-Hand model").
See discussion infra Part I.B.
7 See discussion infra Part I.C-D.
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Not surprisingly, the increased workloads facing the feder-
al circuit courts, as well as the corresponding changes in their
administrative structures and practices, have prompted sub-
stantial scholarly commentary.' Much of this literature can be
readily placed into one of two camps, which essentially battle
over how best to balance concerns of efficiency and justice in
the decision-making of the modern federal appellate courts.
One school defends, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the
transformations in circuit court operations as necessary to
allow the federal appellate courts to continue to function in an
age of ballooning dockets? The opposing school acknowledges
the difficulties posed by the courts' increased workload, but
contends that the changes adopted in the face of those difficul-
ties unduly shift decision-making authority away from those in
whom the authority is constitutionally vested and reduce the
quality of justice for many litigants. °
This Article contends that, while both schools make impor-
tant points, their depictions of the courts of appeals are incom-
plete, which in turn makes many of their recommendations
less than fully satisfying. Commentators have heretofore failed
to take full account of the unique features that structure and
affect the workings and the work product of the federal appel-
late courts. Consequently, assessments of the current state of
affairs and prescriptions for the future have largely failed to be
fully attentive to the special challenges to effective decision-
making in the federal courts of appeals. This Article's main
contention is that certain fundamental, but often overlooked,
institutional features of the modern federal circuit courts sig-
nificantly affect the balance between efficiency and justice in
' Commentators have warned of a caseload "crisis" in the courts of appeals
since at least the late 1960s, see generally Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets
and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the National
Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 31 (1973), and concerns about the impact of the volume of cases
on circuit court practices have spawned dozens of articles by both academics and
judges. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, A Bibliography for the United States Courts of
Appeals, 25 TEX. TECH L. REV. 335, 343-47, 354-405 (1994) (providing an extensive
list of scholarly works concerning the operations of the federal circuit courts, with
lengthy sections on "docket growth and the crisis of volume" and on implemented
"intramural reforms").
See discussion infra Part II.A.
,0 See discussion infra Part IIA.
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appellate decision-making, and that the on-going dialogue
about court reforms must be recast to take full account of these
institutional realities.
Laying the groundwork, Part I details the changes in prac-
tices and structure within the courts of appeals driven by the
dramatic expansion of the federal caseload since the 1960s.
Though this transformation has been noted and debated for
over twenty-five years, our account gives particular attention
to the extremely limited role that each individual circuit judge
now plays in the development of the decisions and doctrines of
the courts of appeals. Part II then reviews and evaluates the
scholarly commentary on the modern circuit courts' practices.
This Part concludes that, while this literature makes many
sound and important observations, the existing commentary
still fails to take full account of the institutional and structural
pressures that the courts of appeals face and therefore is un-
able to suggest fully appropriate alternative directions for the
courts to pursue. Part III describes four essential character-
istics of the existing courts of appeals, as well as the ramifica-
tions of those characteristics for appellate judicial decision-
making. Part IV then develops a more refined model of federal
appellate decision-making and urges the courts of appeals to
explore Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues"--techniques for
the avoidance of premature law-making-as a means of reliev-
ing institutional pressures while avoiding certain "casual vices"
that have been rightly assailed in some scholarly critiques.
I. BURDENS OF AN EXPANDING CASELOAD AND THE JUDICIAL
RESPONSE
The idealized model of circuit court adjudication has at
least seven phases, all of which facilitate and foster careful,
deliberative, and collective judicial appellate decision-making.
The judges considering an appeal are to: (1) review briefs sub-
mitted by the parties, (2) hear oral argument, (3) conference
following oral argument, (4) personally assess the case in a
memorandum to be circulated before or soon after argument
and conference, (5) draft an opinion or opinions, (6) circulate
the draft(s) for comment and modification, and (7) finalize the
opinion(s) for publication.
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At each phase, the appellate judges who are assigned to
the panel for the particular case are to be actively engaged
with the substantive issues of the case and the process for
resolving these issues. The three judges on the appellate panel
are to perform the principal review of the briefs, carefully
reading each submission in preparation for oral argument.
They are to engage the attorneys for the parties in questioning
during the argument and thereafter conference to discuss col-
lectively their views of the case. Just before or just after this
discussion, each judge is to personally articulate her individual
assessment of the case issues in a memorandum to be shared
with the other judges on the panel. Once the group settles on a
tentative resolution of the case, one judge is assigned the task
of drafting the opinion. That judge then prepares the draft; she
may ask her law clerks to assist in research and may use the
clerks as sounding boards, but the draft opinion is primarily
the work of the judge herself. Having finished the draft, the
judge then circulates her work to her colleagues on the panel,
each of whom personally reviews the draft and proposes chang-
es as he or she sees fit. The drafting judge may modify her
opinion to reflect her colleagues' comments, further rounds of
circulation may occur, and the other judges may decide to
prepare concurring or dissenting opinions that also circulate
among the panel members. Finally, the resulting opinion or
opinions are issued by the court and are sent to a publisher to
appear in an official reporter.
In this model, it is a given that all of the judges assigned
to the panel for a case will be actively involved, both individu-
ally and collectively, in every aspect of the court's decision-
making process. Further, the idealized model of circuit court
adjudication includes both formal and informal mechanisms for
even those judges not on an assigned panel to have a hand in a
case's ultimate resolution, especially when the case appears to
be particularly consequential or controversial. As a matter of
court custom, panel members may circulate draft opinions to
all judges of the circuit if and when an opinion seems signif-
icant either because of the issues involved or because it marks
a redirection of circuit precedent. As a more formal matter, the
en banc process provides a means for the parties, or even the
circuit judges themselves, to request that a case be considered
and resolved by all active members of the circuit court.
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This ideal may have reflected reality during the years
when Judge Learned Hand was a member of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit." For the first half of this centu-
ry, the number of cases to be adjudicated by the federal courts
of appeals was sufficiently small to allow such active and col-
lective judicial involvement in every aspect of the appellate
decision-making process. With the relatively few appeals for
the judiciary to handle and with the relatively small number of
judges comprising each circuit, 2 it was reasonable to expect
all three panel members to be actively involved in each case's
resolution, and even possible for nearly every circuit judge to
have some part in the decision-making of nearly every case.
Since the early 1960s, however, the courts of appeals have
had to diverge significantly from the traditional model. That
appellate procedures and methods have changed is conceded by
the judges themselves, many of whom have written,
supportively or critically, of the innovations that the courts
have adopted." The reason for the changes, too, is virtually
uniformly acknowledged: the courts of appeals now decide far
" See generally GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
(1994) (discussing practices of the Second Circuit during Judge Hand's tenure);
MARVIN ScHIcIK LEARNED HAND'S COURT (1970) (same).
12 In 1930, a few years after Learned Hand became a circuit judge, the aver-
age circuit court had only four circuit members and there were only an average of
sixty-four filings per judgeship per year. See WHITE COMMN REPORT, supra note 2,
at 13-14 & tbls. 2-2 & 2-3. In 1950, just before Judge Hand retired from active
service, the average circuit court still had only six circuit members and there were
still only an average of seventy-five filings per judgeship per year. See id.
" See generally Levin H. Campbell, Into the Third Century: Views of the Appel-
late System for the Federal Courts Study Committee, 74 MASS. L. REV. 292 (1989);
Henry J. Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
406 (1972); Ruth B. Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and
Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1983); Edith H. Jones, Back
to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering
Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485 (1995); Donald P. Lay, The Federal
Appeals Process: Whither We Goest? The Next Fifty Years, 15 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 515 (1989); Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to
Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CH. L. REv. 761 (1989); Richard A.
Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Dele-
gation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761 (1983);
William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts,
1993 WIS. L. REV. 1; Steven Reinhart, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79
A.B.A. J. 52 (1993); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits-A
Plug for a Unified Court of Appeals, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 455 (1995); J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J.
1147 (1994).
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more cases than they did during the Learned Hand era, and
they have changed their procedures in an attempt to cope with
their dramatically increased caseloads.
In 1960, the federal appellate courts accepted 3,765 filings,
of which 2,811 represented direct appeals from the district
courts. 4 By 1995, filings had increased to 49,625, of which
43,924 were direct appeals from the district courts. 5 Since
then, the number of appeals has continued to increase: the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that
during the twelve month period ending September 30, 1999,
there were 54,693 appeals filed in the twelve geographical
federal circuits. 6 During this period, the number of federal
circuit judges also has increased, but to a far lesser degree: in
1960, the Judicial Code authorized the existence of 68 circuit
judges distributed among eleven appellate circuits, 7 while the
current code distributes 179 judges among thirteen circuits. s
The result has been a sharp increase in the workloads of indi-
vidual circuit judges: whereas in 1960, a judge was responsible
for approximately 150 cases per year, her counterpart today
bears a load of over 900 cases per year."
1" See RICHARD A POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 57
(1996).
15 See id. at 60-61.
16 Administrative Office of Courts, Judicial Business of the United States
Courts: 1999 Annual Report of the Director, at tbl. B, at http'/www.uscourts.gov/-
judbus1999/b00sep99.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2000). The Administrative Office's
figures do not include appeals to the Federal Circuit. Id. Because Judge Posner
does not cite the source of the statistics he sets forth in his book, it is not clear
whether Judge Posner's numbers can be compared directly with the Administrative
Office's numbers. It appears, however, that the number of federal appellate filings
has continued on an upward course in the years since Judge Posner published his
study, as the Administrative Office reported 51,991 filings for the twelve months
ending September 30, 1996, 52,319 filings for the twelve months ending September
30, 1997, 53,805 filings for the twelve months ending September 30, 1998, and 54,
693 for the twelve months ending September 30, 1999. Id.
17 See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3506 (1984).
'8 See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000). This number includes the twelve judgeships au-
thorized for the Federal Circuit. Id.
"9 The number of appeals filed divided by the total number of active judgeships
yields an average of just over fifty filings per active judge in 1960, but over 300
filings per active judge in 1999. See WHrTE CoIm'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 14
(noting that "[since 1960, circuit judgeships have grown by 160%, but appeals per
judgeship have grown by 450%"). To calculate each judge's average caseload, how-
ever, the number of filings per judgeship must be multiplied by three because
2000]
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With such a pronounced increase, it was inevitable that
the courts would adjust their procedures for disposing of cases.
And, indeed, the courts of appeals today bear only a superficial
resemblance to their predecessors of four decades ago. To be
sure, the courts of appeals continue to decide appeals in panels
of three judges, as they have since the creation of the modern
version of the circuit courts of appeals in 1891.20 But in other
respects, the courts have been transformed from small collec-
tions of largely autonomous judges into large, bureaucratic
institutions in which managerial functions now at least par-
tially define the role and responsibilities of a federal circuit
judge. And in the course of this transformation, both the re-
sponsibilities and the opportunities for each individual circuit
judge to play a role in the development of the decisions and
doctrines of her court of appeals has declined considerably.
A. Changes in Actual Decision-Makers: Visiting and Senior
Judges
Even changes in the appellate process that have not sub-
stantially modified the judicial role still have profoundly affect-
ed the workings of the federal circuit courts. Consider, in par-
ticular, the use of senior and visiting judges. The Judicial Code
allows senior judges and district court judges to sit by designa-
tion on appellate panels; it also permits judges from one circuit
to sit by designation on a panel in another circuit."' As case-
loads have grown, the courts have come to rely increasingly on
senior judges, as well as judges from other circuits and the
district courts, to fill out the panels required to deal with the
burgeoning dockets. Thus, by 1998, nearly twenty-five percent
three judges are involved in the adjudication of each case. Of course, to the extent
senior and visiting district judges fill in, see infra text accompanying notes 21-28,
this total burden for each active judge is reduced somewhat.
2 The Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, Act of March 3, ch. 57, 26 Stat.
826 (1891), popularly known as the Evarts Act, created nine circuit courts of ap-
peals and thereby established the three-tiered federal court system that we know
today. Prior to 1891, the circuit system in the federal courts was primarily a
means of allocating federal trial responsibilities, while the U.S. Supreme Court
served as the principal appellate tribunal. See WMTE COMM'N REPORT, supra note
2, at 7-11 (detailing the history and evolution of the structure and alignment of
the federal court of appeals system); Dragich, supra note 4, at 18-21 (same).
21 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291-294 (2000).
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of the judges participating in the disposition of appeals were
either senior or visiting judges.22
There is nothing inherent in the use of visiting and senior
judges that itself transforms the judicial function. Indeed,
where an appellate panel includes a senior judge from the
panel's own circuit, the panel's functioning may be largely
unaffected since the senior judge, by dint of experience, is like-
ly familiar not only with circuit precedent and the formal local
rules, but also with informal traditions and the personalities of
the judges .within the circuit.' Using judges from other cir-
cuits, however, may introduce some obstacles, as such judges
may have less knowledge of, or regard for, the practices and
precedents of the host circuit than do the circuit's own judg-
es.24 And appointing district judges to serve temporarily on an
appellate panel may introduce problems of its own: the district
judge, accustomed to deciding cases for herself and mindful of
her typical place in the judicial hierarchy, may be somewhat
less willing to find error by one of her district court colleagues
than would an appellate judge.' Nevertheless, in its essence,
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSI-
NESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1998, at 53 tbl. S-2 (1998) [hereinafter 1998
JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. vacancies within a circuit, of course, increase the court's reli-
ance on visiting judges. Thus, in 1991, when the elevation of Judge David Souter
to the Supreme Court and the retirement of Judge Frank Coffin left the First Cir-
cuit with only four active judges, a considerable percentage of the court's dispo-
sitions involved the participation of a visiting or senior judge. Similarly, when a
string of retirements and deaths left the Second Circuit short-staffed in 1998,
panels with visiting or senior judges accounted for nearly fifty percent of the
court's dispositions. See 1998 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra, at 53 tbl. S-2.
' See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 287 (suggesting that the "use of
resident senior circuit judges is close to unobjectionable under any standard").
2 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 287 (contending that "visiting
circuit judges may disturb collegial ways by their disregard for the host circuit's
individual practices, and by their ignorance of, or disdain for, circuit precedent");
see also POSNER, supra note 14, at 135 (expressing concern that "heavy use of
visiting judges ... [increases] the difficulty of maintaining reasonable uniformity
of law within the circuit").
' See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Designated Bunting: Dis-
trict Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals (forthcoming 2002) (demonstrating
through empirical study that district judges sitting by designation typically keep a
low profile by writing fewer opinions and dissents than their appellate peers);
Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal? An Exami-
nation of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United
States Courts of Appeals, 28 MICH. J. OF LAW REFORM 351 (1995) (assessing and
criticizing the use of district judges on the courts of appeals).
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the use of visiting and senior judges creates no obstacles to the
traditional appellate procedure. The decision-making process
remains in the hands of Article III judges.
Yet while the increased reliance on senior and visiting
judges does not fundamentally alter the traditional appellate
process, it still can significantly affect the cohesiveness, the
continuity, and perhaps even the legitimacy of circuit court
decision-making. With senior and visiting judges playing a
substantial role, the federal appellate norm is no longer a
panel of three active judges of the circuit; rather it is a panel
comprised of only two active circuit judges and either a visitor
or a senior judge.26 Indeed, it is not entirely uncommon for a
litigant to have an appeal heard by only one active judge of the
host circuit, with the panel's other two members filled by se-
nior or visiting judges." Combined with the reality that all
but one circuit is comprised of eleven or more active mem-
bers,' the considerable involvement of senior and visiting
judges means that typically less than twenty percent (and
often less than ten percent) of a circuit's active judges directly
participate in the adjudication of each particular case.
26 As noted before, for the year ending in September 1998, nearly twenty-five
percent of the judges participating in dispositions were either senior or visiting
judges. See 1998 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 22, at 53 tbh. S-2. This number
means that a senior or visiting judge is more likely than not to be a member of
the average three-judge appellate panel. Moreover, given that in some circuits the
percentage of visitors or senior judges exceeded thirty percent, and approached
fifty percent in one circuit, see id., in many circuits a considerable majority of
three-judge panels will include a visiting or senior jurist.
27 See JUDITH A. McKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTH-
ER ALTERNATiVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 38 (1993) (noting that
"panels often include only one active circuit judge; some include none").
2 The circuits currently range in size from six to twenty-eight judges:
D.C.: 12 5th: 17 10th: 12
1st: 6 6th: 16 11th: 12
2nd: 13 7th: 11 Fed.: 12
3rd: 14 8th: 11
4th: 15 9th: 28
28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000).
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B. Changes in Functional Decision-Makers: Law Clerks and
Staff Attorneys
Other changes by the federal appellate bench to deal with
increased caseloads even more clearly represent a modification
in the way appellate judges resolve cases, and they serve to
exacerbate the diminution of the role of each judge in the deci-
sions and doctrines of her circuit. Some of these changes have
occurred within the chambers of the individual judges, perhaps
most dramatic among them relating to the number and use of
law clerks. In 1960, each court of appeals judge had but one
law clerk; in 1970, this number increased to two, and in 1980
to three.2 9
This increase in number has often been accompanied by a
change in role. Generalization is difficult, because the manner
in which law clerks are used varies widely from judge to judge,
depending on individual temperament and style. Nevertheless,
there is considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest that judges
rely far more on law clerks than they did in the past. It is
widely recognized, for example, that law clerks now draft many
of the decisions that emanate from an appellate judge's cham-
bers." While judges who have written on the subject often
assert that the decisional function remains with the judge,3'
29 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 139.
" See, e.g., J. Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse?, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 321, 332-34 (1988) (admitting that, in most chambers, law clerks
prepare draft opinions while judges edit those drafts); Patricial M. Wald, The
Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or, Collegiality under Chal-
lenge, 42 MD. L. REV. 766, 777-78 (1983) (suggesting that judges must utilize law
clerks to draft opinions to keep pace with the large number of difficult and com-
plex cases); see also Richard J. Cardamone, How an Expanding Caseload Impacts
Federal Appellate Procedures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 288-92 (1999) (revealing that
his standard practice is to have a clerk "prepare[l the initial draft of [an] opin-
ion"); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 38 (discussing increased reliance on law clerks for opinion
drafting); POSNER, supra note 14, at 143 (asserting that there is "no doubt that
law clerks do more of the opinion writing today than they did thirty-five years
ago").
" See, e.g., Cardamone, supra note 30, at 290; Wald, supra note 30, at 778; see
also Thomas E. Baker, Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have
Helped Themselves, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 913, 945 (1995) (noting that, even
when judges concede that they have delegated some of the responsibilities of opin-
ion writing to clerks, "[tihey explain that the core function-the actual deciding-
still resides with the judge").
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others have suggested that the decision-making process never-
theless does change: the judge, adopting the role of editor rath-
er than drafter, is deprived of the insights and shifts in think-
ing that inevitably occur during the act of drafting.2
Changes in the initial review that a case receives may
have occurred as well. To cope with the increase in the number
of filings, many judges have delegated the initial screening of
cases to their clerks, who will summarize the dispute and
perhaps suggest a possible resolution.3 While the judge in all
likelihood will then review the parties' submissions herself, the
judge's impression of the case is likely to be shaped, at least in
part, by what the law clerks have said or written. Law clerks
may also review draft opinions that have circulated from other
chambers and suggest changes to the judge. Again, while it is
to be expected that the judge will not simply rubberstamp the
law clerks' suggestions, the clerks' initial input is likely to
affect in some way the manner in which the judge reacts to the
work of her colleagues on the bench. Thus, while different
judges have different working styles and interact with their
law clerks in different ways, law clerks appear to have oppor-
tunities to influence judicial decision-making throughout the
appellate process.
The increased number and influence of law clerks has
coincided with the rise of centralized bureaucracies within the
circuits. Some form of bureaucracy is necessary to allow the
courts to function, of course: panels must be created, cases
must be scheduled and assigned, briefs must be distributed,
opinions must be collected for filing and distribution to the
parties, and so on. These purely administrative functions do
not impinge on the judicial role; they merely provide the sup-
port necessary for the performance of that role.34
32 See Dragich, supra note 4, at 32 (arguing that explaining and justifying a
result is integral to decision-making and that "judicial involvement declines and
judicial accountability suffers [and] the appellate process is diluted" when opinion-
writing tasks are delegated to clerks); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 288
(suggesting that "only by writing the opinion herself can [the judge] be sure the
facts play out properly against the reasoning leading to the decision"). See general-
ly Nadine J. Wichern, Note, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the
Media Age, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 621 (1999) (complaining about trend toward having
clerks assume opinion-writing responsibilities).
See Cardamone, supra note 30, at 290; Mahoney, supra note 30, at 333.
'4 To be sure, the random assignment of a case to a particular panel of judges
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The growth of the central circuit office has moved beyond
such administrative functions, however, and has begun to
encompass the substance of cases as well. In particular, the
circuits have created pools of staff attorneys who perform pre-
liminary reviews of the merits of certain classifications of cases
that routinely appear on the appellate dockets, principally
prisoner claims and Social Security appeals. In these cases, a
staff attorney typically will read the briefs to prepare a memo-
randum suggesting a resolution of the appeal and may even
prepare a brief opinion and order disposing of the appeal.35
The staff attorney's memorandum will, of course, be reviewed
in the chambers of the three judges assigned to the case, and
the judges and their law clerks may well disagree with, and
are free to disregard entirely, the staff attorney's proposed dis-
position. Nevertheless, the filtering of the case through a sin-
gle individual in a central office does tend to reduce the likeli-
hood that the case will receive a full, fresh look in the cham-
bers of each judge on the panel and thus decreases the likeli-
hood that issues and arguments not raised (or not well pre-
sented) by the parties will be caught by a member of the pan-
el.36 The rise of the staff attorney therefore fairly may be said
to have a substantive impact on the performance of the judicial
function and thus further dilutes the extent to which circuit
judges control doctrinal developments in their courts.
may have a practical impact on the outcome of the case; so long as the random
assignment process maintains its integrity, however, the act of assigning a case to
a panel does not in any way call for the exercise of judgment but remains a pure-
ly administrative function.
" See, e.g., Baker, supra note 31, at 943-50 (discussing role and impact of cen-
tral staff who assist in case screening for circuit judges); Arthur D. Hellman, Cen-
tral Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV.
937, 982-87 (1980) (same); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 290 (same). The
rise in the use and reliance of central staff was extensively discussed and debated
in the early 1980s in terms of the "bureaucratization" of the federal courts of ap-
peals. See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92
YALE L.J. 1442 (1983); Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warn-
ing, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981); Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal
Method, 80 MICH. L. REv. 248 (1981).
"6 See Baker, supra note 31, at 947-50; Dragich, supra note 4, at 31-32;
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 290-92.
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C. Changes in Input: The Decline of Oral Argument
In addition to personnel changes-within panels, within
chambers, and within central circuit offices-the courts of
appeals have altered the steps that a case goes through before
release of a final decision. In particular, the courts have cut
back dramatically on oral argument. Oral advocacy was once a
fixture in the appellate process, as it remains in law school
moot court programs and in Hollywood's depiction of legal
practice. In reality, however, oral argument in federal appel-
late cases has become the exception rather than the rule: in
roughly sixty percent of appeals filed, the judges reach their
decision after reading the parties' briefs but without hearing
argument."7
To be sure, the parties may request argument, which will
increase the likelihood that it will be granted. Moreover, the
circuits vary widely in their approaches to oral argument. In
the Second Circuit, for example, it remains the norm rather
than the exception." In other circuits, however, the reverse is
true: the Third Circuit, for example, has a tradition of having
entire days of calendared cases in which no argument is
heard."
This streamlining of the appellate process may properly be
expected to reduce, at least at the margins, the degree of atten-
tion that many cases receive. To be sure, oral argument may
not be useful in all cases. A pro se litigant, for example, is
unlikely to provide much useful insight into any claims of error
on the part of the district court, simply because of lack of fa-
miliarity with the law and with proper court procedures."
37 See WHITE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 & tbl. 2-6; see also POSNER,
supra note 14, at 160-62 (discussing "the curtailment of both the length and fre-
quency of oral argument"); Baker, supra note 31, at 915-23 (same).
38 See WHITE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 & tbl. 2-6. (detailing that
the Second Circuit hears oral argument in eighty-five percent of cases involving
counsel and in sixty-five percent of all cases).
39 See JOE S. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT,
DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF AP-
PEALS 113-30 (1987).
"' Values other than simply assisting the court in reaching an appropriate
result may be served by permitting pro se litigants to argue. Participation itself
may have value by providing the pro se litigant with the sense that she has had
an opportunity to be heard. See Dragich, supra note 4, at 31-32; Richman &
Reynolds, supra note 5, at 290-92.
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Some counsel, unfortunately, similarly struggle when set be-
fore an appellate panel. The value of argument, however,
should not be underestimated simply because it is not uniform-
ly of high quality. Oral argument represents the only real
chance for the judges to ask questions of those who know the
case the best-the attorneys who litigated the action in the
district court. In the absence of argument, a judge is deprived
not merely of the opportunity to have her own questions an-
swered, but also of the chance to hear from her colleagues on
the panel, whose questions may reveal their thoughts about
the case in ways that conference alone could not.4' Moreover,
the possibility exists that the very fact of oral argument will
lead the judge to examine the case more carefully than she
would in the absence of argument, so as to be prepared with
questions for the parties.
D. Changes in Output: Unpublished Opinions and Judgment
Orders
Among the most dramatic changes at the courts of appeals
in recent decades has been the emergence of the unpublished
opinion. It used to be that virtually all of the courts' disposi-
tions of appeals, at least in those cases that reached the merits
of the appeals, were published in the Federal Reporter.42 As
41 See Stanley Mosk, In Defense of Oral Argument, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
25, 27 (1999) (stressing that "oral argument provides an important forum for an
interchange of ideas between counsel and the judges, and between the judges
themselves"). A similar reduction in the "input" judges receive, which is also a
casualty of increased caseloads, concerns the practice of writing and circulating
pre-conference memoranda in which each judge develops his or her own tentative
view on the legal issues under consideration. As Gerald Gunther has explained,
the use of pre-conference memos, which "reached its peak during [Judge Hand's]
tenure" on the Second Circuit, served to "promote individual consideration of each
case prior to giving it collegiate attention" and "assured an unequaled degree of
intellectual engagement." Gerald Gunther, Reflections on Judicial Administration in
the Second Circuit, from the Perspective of Learned Hand's Days, 60 BROOK. L.
REV. 505, 508 (1994); see also GUNTHER, supra note 11, at 286-88 (discussing
Judge Hand's use of pre-conference memorandum). But, despite recognizing the
considerable benefits that flow from this practice, the burdens of an increased
caseload has entailed that "the use of pre-conference voting memoranda has de-
clined significantly." Cardamone, supra note 30, at 284; see also Gunther, supra, at
509 (lamenting the declining use of pre-conference memorandum).
42 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 163; Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publica-
tion of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus Empirical
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the number of dispositions began to increase, however, and the
production of new volumes of the official reports began to ac-
celerate, voices within the judiciary began to question whether
it was necessary to publish in every case.43
At present, each circuit, by local rule, allows cases to be
decided by unpublished opinion. At its most basic, the "opin-
ion" may be no more than a one-word or one-sentence order,
stating simply that the judgment of the district court is re-
versed or, more commonly, affirmed. More typical is the sum-
mary opinion, either attributed to one judge or per curiam,
which sets forth a brief summary of the facts and a short ex-
planation of the court's result. In many instances, this expla-
nation is very brief, though the sheer number of issues raised
on appeal may lead the judges to write a longer opinion in
some cases. On occasion, the length and intellectual rigor of an
unpublished opinion may rival those of opinions that appear in
the Federal Reporter.
The circuits vary widely both in the types of unpublished
opinions that they write and in the proportion of cases that
they decide by unpublished opinion." These differences seem
to be as much the product of different informal norms as any
written policy.45 There are significant formal differences, how-
Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 308 (1990).
See generally Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if
They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judi-
cial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995) (detailing
increased use of unpublished opinions); see also Robert J. Martineau, Restrictions
on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 119 (1995) (same); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable
Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989) (same); William L. Reynolds &
William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-
citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167
(1978) (same).
14 See WHITE COMMN REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 & tbl. 2-7 (reporting vary-
ing circuit rates for cases decided on the merits that resulted in a published opin-
ion); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Pre-
dicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 112
(2001) (discussing results of empirical study showing "substantial difference in
publication rates among the circuits").
" See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 44, at 111 (noting that, while formal
publication criteria within each circuit "play a large role in predicting publica-
tion . .. , tludges for different circuits apply relatively similar publication criteria
to arrive at widely different publication rates").
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ever, in the weight that the circuits attach to unpublished
opinions. Including the Federal Circuit, six circuits prohibit
any citation to unpublished opinions, except perhaps where
offered to establish claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or law of
the case; whereas in six other circuits, unpublished opinions
may be cited in unrelated cases, but even there the opinions
may be cited for their persuasive value alone, and citation
usually is "disfavored."46 In none of the circuits are unpub-
lished opinions binding precedent.47 This treatment arises out
of the courts' rationale for the unpublished opinions: the notion
that, where a case is easily resolved on the basis of existing
law, there is no need for the court to take the time to write a
polished, published opinion because the case adds nothing new
to the body of law, and there is no need for anyone to cite the
court's decision because other precedent exists to establish the
pertinent point.
"' Compare D.C. Cir. R. 28(c) (prohibiting citation to unpublished opinions for
purposes other than preclusion); 1st Cir. R. 36.2(b)(6) (allowing citation of unpub-
lished opinions only in related cases); 2d Cir. R. § 0.23 (same); 7th Cir. R. 53(b)(2)
(prohibiting citation to unpublished orders except for purposes of claim preclusion,
issue preclusion, or law of the case); 9th Cir. R. 36-2 (same); Fed. Cir. R. 47.6
(prohibiting citation of unpublished opinion as precedent); with 4th Cir. R. 36(c)
(citation to unpublished opinions is disfavored but is permissible where counsel
believes that no published opinion would serve as well); 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4 (stating
that an unpublished opinion is not precedent but may be persuasive); 6th Cir. R.
24(c) (stating that citation to unpublished opinions is disfavored but is permissible
where counsel believes that no published opinion would serve as well); 8th Cir. R.
28A(k) (allowing citation where the unpublished opinion is persuasive and no other
opinion would serve as well); 10th Cir. R. 36-3 (unpublished opinion may be cited
if it is persuasive, no published opinion has addressed the issue, and citation
would assist the court); 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (unpublished opinion is not binding pre-
cedent but may be persuasive). The Third Circuit is something of a wildcard. Its
local rules are silent on the citability of unpublished opinions. The court's Internal
Operating Procedures state that the court will not cite unpublished opinions, but
as to whether counsel may cite such opinions in their submissions to the court,
the Internal Operating Procedures are silent. See 3RD CIR. INT. OP. PROC. 5.8. In
practice, it appears that counsel do occasionally refer to unpublished opinions in
their briefs.
47 In a surprising and remarkable opinion that is discussed infra at Part
IV.B.2.d, a panel on the Eighth Circuit very recently held unconstitutional a local
circuit rule which restricted the precedential authority of unpublished opinions. See
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000) (en banc). Whether the Eighth Circuit itself or other circuits will begin
to change its established local rules and customs concerning the precedential effect
of unpublished opinions remains to be seen.
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II. CASUAL VICES OR NECESSARY EVILS?
Inevitably, the changes that the courts of appeals have
undergone have generated commentary by both scholars and
judges. Commentators generally have divided into two camps.
Those who oppose what the courts have done to cope with their
increased workload criticize the development of what might be
called "casual vices," labor-saving mechanisms by which the
courts have abdicated much of their responsibility, both to the
parties that appear before them and to the system of law that
their decisions create. Those who defend the changes tend to
do so on the grounds that these steps were necessary to allow
the courts to function under their increased burdens, although
they do argue that the use of unpublished opinions has had the
positive effect of preventing the existing body of binding prece-
dent from becoming so unwieldy as to be unmanageable.
Both camps raise legitimate concerns about the changes
that the courts of appeals have undergone in the past four
decades. Ultimately, however, neither side's position is entirely
satisfactory. In part this is so because each side tends to over-
state its own positions and undervalue those of the other. But
in part this is so because each rests on a conception of the
federal courts of appeals that is not fully formed, or at least
not fully articulated.
A. The Casual Vices
There are many vocal critics of the courts' of appeals
transformation in the face of increased caseloads.48 These
commentators acknowledge, as they must, that, given the pres-
48 A complete list of all the works that express concern about modern federal
circuit court practices would itself fill dozens of pages. See generally Baker, supra
note 8 (providing an extensive list of scholarly works concerning the operations of
the federal circuit courts). Among the most prominent of these critics are Professor
Thomas Baker, see, e.g., THOMAS A. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1995); Baker, supra note 31; Profes-
sors William Richman and William Reynolds, see, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra
note 5; William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Judge-
ships, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37 (1999); Professor Martha Dragich, see, e.g.,
Dragich, supra note 4; Dragich, supra note 43; and Professor Lauren K Robel, see,
e.g., Rebel, supra note 30; Rebel, supra note 43. Most of the criticisms summarized
in this section are drawn from the works of these commentators.
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sures of burgeoning dockets, the courts could not remain what
they once were, in idealized form if not always in reality: rela-
tively small, collegial bodies whose members had more than
sufficient time to delve into each case, deliberate, and explain
their considered judgment in published opinions. They contend,
nevertheless, that the particular mechanisms that the courts
have adopted threaten the integrity of the bench.
Focusing on changes in personnel, critics contend that the
increase in the number of law clerks and the rise of circuit
staff attorneys have changed the role of the individual circuit
judge in a way that is ultimately inconsistent with the act of
judging. The increase in law clerks has fundamentally altered
the judge-clerk relationship: with only one clerk, judges could
be the principal motivating force behind the clerk's efforts;
with multiple clerks working independently on different pro-
jects, the judge cannot maintain the same level of involvement
in the clerks' work. Staff attorneys pose an even more serious
threat to the appellate system, according to critics, because
they are hired through a central administrative office and
work in their own offices. The supervision and interaction
between the staff attorneys and judges is minimal which
means that, unlike personal law clerks who can become famil-
iar with the judge's way of thinking and mold to the judge's
style, staff attorneys will remain largely detached from the
personal dynamics of working with the judges they serve. This
relative independence of the staff attorneys, which is furthered
by the fact that they do not work for any one judge but serve
the circuit at large, represents in the view of critics an even
more substantial shift in power away from the judges into the
hands of a central, non-judicial administrative body. The dele-
gation of the chore of drafting opinions to law clerks and cen-
tral staff simply exacerbates the transfer of power.
The increasing roles that law clerks and staff attorneys
play in the appellate process has had two deleterious conse-
quences, according to critics. First, it has tended to move pow-
er away from Article III judges and into the hands of non-judi-
cial personnel who lack the training and experience, not to
mention the formalities of the nomination and confirmation
processes, that judges have.49 While critics have difficulty
"9 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 31, at 944-46; Richman & Reynolds, supra note
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pointing to individual cases and suggesting that different re-
sults would have been reached had the influence of law clerks
or staff attorneys been less, they suggest that, given the sub-
stantive input that law clerks and staff attorneys have, such
cases are virtually inevitable." Second, the role of law clerks
and, to a lesser extent, staff attorneys in drafting opinions has
meant that the quality of the court's collective work has de-
clined. Law clerks, after all, tend to be at the beginning of
their legal careers; they are aware, as well, of their subsidiary
positions within chambers. They thus lack the experience, the
vision, and frequently the confidence to write distinctive, origi-
nal opinions, and tend instead to fall into familiar rhythms
and patterns.5 The result is too many plodding, dull opinions
that lack the spark of creative legal thought.
Professors Richman and Reynolds criticize these collective
developments by giving clerks and staff the label of "para-judg-
es," and they assert and lament that "inappropriate delegation
of quintessentially judicial tasks has become the norm."52 In
the view of Professors Richman and Reynolds and other like
critics, appellate judges have been transformed from principal
actors into managers and supervisors of the actions of oth-
ers.5' The critics also take issue with the changes in appellate
procedures that have accompanied the changes in personnel.
They decry the limits on the availability of oral argument.'
Critics argue that in the absence of the opportunity to explore
the subtleties of the case in an interactive environment with
those who know the most about the case, judges are less likely
to render sufficiently nuanced decisions, thus diminishing the
5, at 291-92.
See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 289, 291-92.
51 Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Richard Posner, who tends to take a more bal-
anced perspective in his analysis of federal court transformations, see generally
POSNER, supra note 14, has expressed particular concern about the impact of law
clerks and other non-judicial personnel on opinion writing. See Richard A. Posner,
Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1446-49
(1995) (suggesting that the formalized voice in which many opinions are written is
the product of excessive involvement by law clerks and operates to stifle the cre-
ativity of judicial thought).
52 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 287-88.
s See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 289, 291-92; see also Baker, su-
pra note 31, at 944-51.
14 See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 279-81; Baker, supra note
31, at 915-23.
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quality of justice that the courts are able to deliver.55 They
suggest, moreover, that oral argument serves more than sim-
ply a functionalist purpose; it also furthers participatory values
by allowing losing parties to feel that they have at least had
the opportunity to be heard."
Critics frequently reserve the worst of their ire for unpub-
lished opinions. While summary orders---one-sentence disposi-
tions that say nothing about the reasons for the court's deci-
sion-typically receive the harshest treatment, opponents of
unpublished opinions express a more general concern about the
impact of unpublished opinions on the quality of justice that
the circuit courts deliver. Commentators frequently bemoan
the alacrity with which many unpublished opinions are writ-
ten, suggesting that the brief and unpolished summary memo-
randa issued by the courts betray a lack of careful thought on
the part of the deciding judges.5" Worse, opponents note, un-
published opinions frequently reflect, even more so than pub-
lished opinions, significant contributions by law clerks and
staff attorneys, individuals who lack the expertise and experi-
ence, let alone the constitutionally granted authority, of Article
III judges.5 8 The result is second-class justice, or at least the
perception of lesser justice, since parties whose arguments are
dismissed summarily in unpublished opinions may feel that
they have not been treated with sufficient respect and that
their claims have not been given due consideration.59
B. The Necessary Evils
Those who defend the appellate courts' adaptations to
their increased workload tend to do so without tremendous
enthusiasm, and often with some reservations. These defenders
" See, e.g., Baker, supra note 31, at 919; see also Mosk, supra note 41, at 27;
Stephen L. Wasby, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument:
Some Views of Lawyers and Federal Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 340 (1982); Don
Babwin, Appealing Oral Aiguments, CAL. LAW., Sept., 1992, at 19.
5 See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 281.
, See, e.g., Dragich, supra note 43, at 785-800; Robel, supra note 43, at 945;
see also Reynolds & Richman, supra note 43, at 1205.
s See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 289, 291-92.
See, e.g., Baker, supra note 31, at 953. See generally Kerri L. Mover, Com-
ment, "Order Opinions"--The Public's Perception of Injustice, 21 WlI. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1225 (1996).
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frequently are judges, individuals who experience first-hand
the burdens of overcrowded dockets." Many of them express a
wistful longing for the days of the Learned Hand model. The
present arrangements, in other words, do not accord with their
notions of how the ideal appellate court would function. Still,
they recognize that appellate filings will not decline to their
previous levels, and they believe that the adjustments that the
courts have made represent appropriate accommodations to the
present reality.6' They experience personally the need for help
in handling their duties and the benefits of having young,
bright, enthusiastic minds to assist them with their work;
thus, while they recognize the danger of deferring too much to
their law clerks, they see no need to complain of their pres-
ence.62 Similarly, staff attorneys are seen as an efficient
means of addressing large numbers of cases in well-defined
categories that repeatedly raise a narrow set of issues.63 And,
in their minds, where a case presents a straightforward legal
question on the briefs, oral argument would be superfluous."
Law clerks, staff attorneys, and restrictions on oral argument,
then, principally represent time-saving devices that allow judg-
es to concentrate their energies where they are most needed.
Unpublished opinions, on the other hand, are sometimes
seen as more than a time-saving device. To be sure, defenders
of unpublished opinions note the efficiencies that unpublished
opinions create. Commentators argue that requiring published
opinions in all cases would cause judges already overburdened
' See, e.g., Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 177, 182-83 (1999); Phillip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions:
One Judge's View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909 (1986); Cardamone, supra note 30;
Wald, supra note 30; POSNER, supra note 14; see also sources cited supra note 13.
Most of the defenses of circuit court transformations summarized in this section
are drawn from these works.
61 See, e.g., Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts:
Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1485, 1494-97 (1995) (reviewing BAKER, supra note 48); Cardamone, supra note 30;
Mahoney, supra note 30; Martin, supra note 60; Wald, supra note 30.
62 See generally Cardamone, supra note 30; Mahoney, supra note 30; Wald,
supra note 30.
' See, e.g., Jones, supra note 61, at 1494.
1 See Alvin B. Rubin & Gilbert Ganucheau, Appellate Delay and Cost-An
Ancient and Common Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 MD. L. REV. 752, 762 (1983);
see also Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge
to Conventional Wisdom, 72 IowA L. REv. 1, 21-24 (1986).
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by swelling caseloads to spend too much of their limited time
on cases with little merit.' In addition, they claim that re-
quiring the publication of all dispositions would add needlessly
to the bulk of the Federal Reporter diminishing the cohesive-
ness and coherence of the body of the law.66 Unpublished
opinions, in the supporters' view, act as a safety valve to re-
lieve the pressure on both the judges' workloads and the li-
brary shelves groaning under the ever-increasing mass of pub-
lished authority.67
C. The Missing Pieces
The debate between supporters and opponents of the
changes in the courts of appeals ultimately is unsatisfying. The
criticisms levied against the alterations contain some fair
points, and yet many of them carry an air of unreality. Consid-
er the critique of the failure to hold oral argument in all cases.
Anyone who has spent much time in an appellate courtroom
knows that there are many cases in which oral argument is
little more than a pro forma exercise, adding little to nothing
of substance to the arguments set forth in the briefs. In such
cases, foregoing oral argument hardly seems a terrible loss.
Provided, therefore, that judges make their decisions in a fair-
minded fashion and do not give the perceived inconveniences of
oral argument too much weight, little would seem lost from the
decision not to hear oral argument in every case.6" At some
level, many of the most vocal critics of circuit court
transformations seem to view the statutory right to appeal as
' See, e.g., Jones, supra note 61, at 1494-95; Diana Gribbon Motz, A Federal
Judge's View of Richard A. Posner's THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND RE-
FORM, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1029, 1038 (1998) (Book Review); Alex Kozinski &
Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This: Why We Don't Allow Citation to Unpub-
lished Dispositions, CAL. LAWYER, June, 2000, at 43.
See, e.g., Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 65, at 43, Martin, supra note 60,
at 181-83.
See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 60, at 927-28; Martin, supra note 60, at 181-83.
cs Critics may counter that, while there may be cases in which oral argument
proves unproductive, it is difficult to identify in advance the cases in which oral
argument will lack value. Yet if anyone is capable of making such a prediction, it
would seem to be the appellate judges themselves, who work immersed in the
arguments, written and oral, of counsel. And the requirement that the decision not
to hear argument be unanimous among panel members adds a layer of protection
against the erroneous judgments of any single judge.
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if it was a requirement that a set of judges devote an enor-
mous amount of time to the consideration of every litigant's
claim of error, giving inordinate attention to every aspect of
the decision-making process even when the case's resolution is
straightforward, clear, and easily seen.
The solutions that the critics propose, too, sometimes seem
similarly ungrounded. Professors Richman and Reynolds, for
example, have been outspoken in calling for a dramatic in-
crease in the number of circuit judges as a means of restoring
the ratio of cases per judge to something approaching what it
was in the 1960s.69 Restoring the balance between the num-
ber of judges and the number of cases, they believe, would
reduce reliance on law clerks, eliminate the need for staff at-
torneys, and leave the judges time to hear oral argument.70
Yet while Professors Richman and Reynolds have reasoned
rejoinders to those who argue that such a change would de-
stroy the collegiality of the courts and increase the number of
inter- and intra-circuit conflicts, they fail to fully defuse con-
cerns that massive expansion of the federal judiciary could
dilute the quality of judicial decision-makers or at least dimin-
ish the perceived importance of the task of federal judges so
that no single federal decision garners the extended attention
or scrutiny that at least some cases now receive.7 Perhaps
even more damning, the proposal of Professors Richman and
Reynolds, like so many well-intentioned suggestions put for-
ward by those in the academy, has little or no real chance of
being adopted. Given the slow pace at which existing vacancies
have been filled over the past decade, as well as the disdain
with which elected officials from each major party decry the
"activism" of judges nominated by presidents of the other par-
ty, it seems highly unlikely that a plan calling for the doubling
or tripling of the size of the federal judiciary could be passed
into law.
Those who defend the changes in the courts of appeals, in
contrast, seem too focused on the bottom line, on the ability of
the courts to clear cases from their dockets efficiently. This is,
"' See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 297-334; Richman, supra note 48,
at 39-47.
'o See Richman, supra note 48, at 50-51.
7' See Jon 0. Newman, Litigation Reform and the Dangers of Growth of the
Federal Judiciary, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1125, 1128-32 (1997).
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to be sure, an important goal-the cases on the courts' dockets
must be decided, both for their own sakes and to allow judges
to move on to subsequent filings, which show no sign of abat-
ing. Many of the defenders, however, pay little if any heed to
competing concerns, notably participatory values and the ap-
pearance of fairness. A party whose appeal is decided without
oral argument, and whose arguments are summarily dismissed
in a brief, unpublished opinion, is unlikely to be satisfied-not
only because she did not prevail, but also because of the ap-
pearance that the court did not treat her appeal seriously.
Such a litigant is likely to note, as well, that other parties in
other appeals seem to have been treated more respectfully:
they have had the chance to argue before the court, and the
court has explained its decision in a reasoned manner, in an
opinion that is disseminated to the public through the court's
official reporter. This is not to say that the courts must be
brought to a standstill so as to devote a massive amount of
time and energy to each and every case. But the court that
ignores these concerns goes a long way toward defeating the
truism that the law is no respecter of persons.
What ultimately is unsatisfying about the debate is not
simply that those engaged in it seem to be talking past each
other, but rather that they seem to rest on incomplete concep-
tions of the unique role and the unique structure of the federal
courts of appeals. The courts of appeals are more than dispute
resolvers; they are also uniquely important and central as the
custodians of a complex and ever-changing body of law. These
roles create competing demands, which are compounded by the
unique institutional pressures faced by circuit courts resulting
from their position between the district courts, which resolve
factual disputes, and the Supreme Court, which authoritatively
interprets the law. Moreover, the judicial structure through
which circuit judges must discharge these functions compounds
and complicates the challenges that confront the federal courts
of appeals. Those who have addressed the increases in the
appellate caseload, and the reforms undertaken to cope with
those increases, do recognize these elements at some level, but
they seem not to have thought through their implications for
the courts' ability to formulate and develop a coherent body of
law in an age with more courts, more judges, and more cases.
Part III endeavors to provide a more complete and realistic
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account of the central challenges to effective decision-making
for the modern federal courts of appeals.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE FOR THE COURTS OF
APPEALS
A. The Competing (Yet Intertwined) Functions of the Courts of
Appeals
It is frequently observed that the courts of appeals have
two essential functions: error-correction and law-making.72
The first function is to provide litigants who believe they have
been victimized by erroneous decisions in the district courts
with a forum in which claims of error may be assessed. The
obligation for courts of appeals in discharging this error-correc-
tion function is to ensure that an appropriate and just outcome
has been reached in each individual case brought before them.
As such, this function is inherently backward-looking: the
appeals court looks back at the district court proceedings to
adjudge whether a fair process and a just result were achieved
in that forum.
The second function of the courts of appeals is to develop a
body of law that defines the parameters of legal rights and
obligations for those subject to the law and that provides guid-
ance to courts for the adjudication of subsequent cases. This is
the law-making function of the circuit courts of appeals, and it
is inherently forward-looking: the appeals court looks forward
with a concern for effectively and justly governing the future
behavior of actors and courts.
Of course, it almost goes without saying that each of these
important functions independently presents its own special
challenges for the federal appellate courts. Looking back at
completed proceedings, wise and well-intentioned jurists will
often disagree as to whether error was committed below, and
they may also reach different reasonable conclusions concern-
," See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 48, at 14-16; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUS-
TICE ON APPEAL 2-4 (1976); ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00, commentary, at 5 (1994 ed.)
("The appellate courts have two functions: to review individual cases to assure
that substantial justice has been rendered, and to formulate and develop the law
for general application in the legal system.").
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ing the appropriate remedy for any errors that are identified.
Likewise, looking forward toward the developing legal land-
scape, judges will frequently have differing views as to the
proper direction for the law to evolve, as well as divergent vi-
sions concerning the appropriate means for courts to engineer
legal change.
Less discussed than the inherent challenges of error-cor-
rection and law-making for a circuit court is the fact that these
two functions, taken together, will sometimes pull an appellate
court in different directions, especially as the judges decide
how best to craft their opinions. Consider a court's position
when concluding on appeal that there was some procedural
flaw in a lower-court proceeding, but that this flaw in the case
at hand does not justify reversing the decision below. For ex-
ample, imagine a criminal prosecution in which the defendant,
having been convicted at trial, complains on appeal that the.
district judge erroneously allowed evidence of an illegal search
to get before the jury. The appellate panel is convinced that
the search was indeed illegal but also believes that the error in
allowing evidence from the search to be introduced was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the court's error-cor-
rection function, it would suffice to simply affirm the convic-
tion; because the district court's error did not affect the ulti-
mate result, there is no need to correct it. At the very most, if
an error-correcting court believes it should explain the basis of
its decision as a service to the parties or as a means to check
and fortify its conclusions, the appeals court might write a
brief opinion simply explaining that any error was harmless,
without addressing the question of whether the search was
illegal. On the other hand, the court's law-making duties sug-
gest the panel should provide in its opinion a full account of
not only the basis for finding the error harmless, but also the
reasons why the search was illegal. This discussion will then
have the potential to influence law enforcement personnel in
future searches, and to affect the analysis of district courts in
future cases in which similar searches are challenged. This
section of the court's opinion will of course be dictum because
it is not necessary to the resolution of the case. The panel may
nevertheless expect that, as an indication of the court's think-
ing, it will have influence and thus contribute in a broad sense
to the existing body of law. In other words, the appellate
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court's obligation to achieve a just result in this individual case
(its error-correction function) could be discharged by a simple
affirmance, but the court's obligation to define the law for the
future (its law-making function) would require a meaningful
and instructive explanation of both the nature of the mistake
that occurred below and why this mistake should not lead to a
reversal.
Moreover, and of critical importance for a full appreciation
of the appellate courts' work, though the dual obligations of
error-correction and law-making often create competing de-
mands, they are inextricably linked. Judges' perceptions of,
and contributions to, the legal landscape and legal trends will
always be affected by the specific facts and procedural posture
of the case before them, as well as by the specific arguments
developed (and not developed) by the parties. Put another way,
the appellate courts' perspective and production as lawmakers
looking forward are defined and shaped by the cases and
claimed errors they are looking back upon. Consequently, the
order and the manner in which individual cases come before
appellate courts is of great import; the unique case-specific
context in which certain issues are first raised will inevitably
affect the development of the law. Even though appellate
courts cannot possibly know or foresee all the contexts in
which future cases will raise certain legal issues, their initial
decisions on particular issues in the context of individual cases
will shape, through the power of precedent, the framework
within which future cases are decided.
The inherent tension and necessary synergy between er-
ror-correction and law-making functions is a fundamental
aspect of the work of every appellate court. Critically, though,
these appellate dynamics combine with the unique institution-
al structure of the federal courts of appeals to produce particu-
lar difficulties for these courts in discharging their judicial
responsibilities and ensuring the sound and sensible develop-
ment of the law. There are four central characteristics of the
federal courts of appeals--characteristics that define the types
of cases that come before the courts, the procedures by which
the courts decide cases, and the ramifications of the courts'
decisions for future litigation-which deepen and aggravate the
tension created by the competing functions of error-correction
and law-making. To fully appreciate these dynamics, it is im-
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portant to review and examine these four fundamental fea-
tures of the federal circuit courts.
B. The Four Key Characteristics of the Courts of Appeals
Within the federal judiciary, the courts of appeals occupy a
unique place, have a unique structure, and exercise unique
powers. In the federal district courts, judges act individually
and independently to decide an enormous number of cases and
address a range of issues, but their legal rulings lack any bind-
ing precedential effect. In the United States Supreme Court,
the justices act collectively (though rarely cohesively) and com-
mand the observance of lower courts, but they decide only a
limited number of cases each year. Resting between these
courts and expected to rule both collectively in panels of three
judges and independently through separate panels, the judges
of the federal circuit courts face a variety of particular institu-
tional challenges that affect virtually every aspect of the
courts' business and have a profound impact on both their
error-correction and law-making functions.
1. Mandatory Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts, as defined
by statute, consists of two major categories: appeals from final
judgments and interlocutory appeals. As to the latter catego-
ry-which represents only a tiny fraction of the courts of
appeals' dockets 7 -the appellate courts have wide discretion
to accept or reject particular petitions for review.' 4 As to the
,' See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1176, 1198-99 (1990) (discussing statistics
concerning small number of interlocutory appeals and urging greater use of this
procedure).
7' See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000); see also MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR,
FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE § 2.09, at 106-12 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing procedures for seeking interlocutory appeals). Even if the district court
has reached a conclusion that the case presents an important legal question as to
which there is substantial ground for disagreement and that the ultimate termina-
tion of the case will be advanced by an immediate appeal, the court of appeals
retains the authority to refuse to hear the appeal. See TIGAR & TIGAR, supra, at
110-11 (discussing cases in which circuit courts refused to hear interlocutory ap-
peal despite certification of appeal by district judge). Some categories of interlocu-
tory appeals do fall within the appellate courts' mandatory jurisdiction, including:
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former category, however, jurisdiction is mandatory: a party
against whom a district court enters a final judgment may
seek review before the court of appeals for the circuit in which
the case was brought.75 Thus, by law, any and every litigant
dissatisfied with a judgment at the district court level has an
appeal as of right to the court of appeals in her circuit. Put
another way, the federal courts of appeals, in discharging their
error-correction function, are obliged to examine and assess
every claim of error asserted to them.
As a consequence of its mandatory jurisdiction, the federal
courts of appeals have no effective means of controlling the
number or types of cases that come before them. Though a
court of appeals has some discretion when deciding precisely
how to resolve cases on its docket, it must render an on-the-
record disposition in every case in which an appeal is
sought.76 Unlike the Supreme Court, which is able to struc-
ture its caseload and decision-making through the exercise of
its certiorari power," the courts of appeals have no real con-
trol over the content of their dockets. While the Supreme Court
can determine the time, manner, and context in which it will
address and resolve particular issues by carefully selecting
appeals from orders granting, denying, modifying, or dissolving injunctions; appeals
from orders appointing receivers; and appeals from certain decrees in admiralty
cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).
75 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
"G The methods of on-the-record dispositions vary from circuit to circuit, as
each federal circuits' local rules set' forth various means for resolving appeals. See
D.C. Cir. R. 36(b) (permitting the court to use abbreviated disposition methods
when deemed appropriate); 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27.1 (allowing for summary disposi-
tion); 1st Cir. Loc. R. 36.1 (permitting the court to choose the method of dispo-
sition: order, memorandum and order, or opinion); 2nd Cir. § 0.23 (permitting for
disposition in open court or by summary order); 3rd Cir. Appx. 6.2 (permitting for
use of judgment order as a method of disposition); 5th Cir. R. 47.6 (allowing af-
firmance without opinion); 6th Cir. R. 19 (providing for disposition in open court
after oral arguments); 7th Cir. R. 53(c) (permitting the use of unpublished orders);
8th Cir. R. 47A (allowing the use of summary disposition); 8th Cir. R. 47B (per-
mitting affirmance, and sanctioning enforcement, without opinion); 9th Cir. R. 3-6
(providing for summary disposition); 10th Cir. R. 27.2 (providing for summary
disposition); 10th Cir. R. 36.1 (allowing the court to dispose of certain appeals by
unpublished order); 11th Cir. R. 36-1 (providing for affirmance without opinion);
Fed. Cir. R. 36 (providing for affirmance without opinion).
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2000). See generally David M. OBrien, The
Rehnquist Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 81 JUDICATURE 58 (1997) (discussing
how the Supreme Court has reduced its caseload through fewer grants of certio-
rari).
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which cases to grant certiorari on the merits, the federal courts
of appeals may not decline to hear an appeal that falls within
their mandatory jurisdiction, and they have only a limited
practical authority to defer resolution of such an appeal.7"
Moreover, unless an appeal raises multiple issues, resolution of
any one of which would represent a full disposition of the ap-
peal, a circuit court is not at liberty to pick and choose among
the issues presented. In this way, the courts of appeals resem-
ble the federal district courts, which, with very narrow excep-
tions, must hear cases within their subject matter jurisdiction.
In both the courts of appeals and the district courts, the liti-
gants, rather than the courts, determine which, how, and when
issues must be addressed.
These realities, which are a product of the courts of
appeals' robust error-correction obligation, have a profound
impact on the circuit courts' functioning as lawmakers. If a
legal issue in a petition for certiorari does not seem ripe for
resolution, or if a particular case presents that issue in a pecu-
liar manner, or even if the parties and their counsel simply
appear unable to brief and argue the issue effectively, the
Supreme Court can, through denial of certiorari, avoid consid-
eration of the issue and thus avoid any potential problems the
case might pose for effective law-making. Lacking such author-
ity, and forced to examine each and every asserted error, the
courts of appeals are forced to discharge their law-making
obligations through cases in which the time, manner, posture,
and c6ntext are determined by aggrieved litigants.
2. Courts of Last Resort
As the mid-level courts in the three-tiered federal judicia-
ry, the courts of appeals technically are not courts of last re-
78 Interestingly, Professors Reynolds and Richman contend and complain that
circuit courts' use of unpublished opinions, combined with other court practices,
has now resulted in de facto certiorari that denies to the parties the full benefits
of an appeal of right. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 5, at 275; see also
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The New Certiorari Courts, 80 JUDI-
CATURE 206, 206 (1997). However, as discussed in Part IV, we believe that there
may actually be some considerable value in the ability of the courts of appeals to
exercise a certiorari-like control over the discharge of their law-making function.
See infra Part IV.
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sort. A party that suffers defeat before the appellate court
remains free to petition the Supreme Court for review on writ
of certiorari. As a practical matter, though, this is little more
than a paper right for the vast majority of litigants. In 1998,
the Supreme Court received over 7,000 petitions for certiorari,
comprising requests for review of state supreme court decisions
as well as decisions from the federal appellate courts. 9 Of
these, the Supreme Court granted the writ and took the appeal
in only eighty-one cases; certiorari thus was granted in just
over one percent of those cases in which review was sought.'
This highly limited application of discretionary jurisdiction by
the Supreme Court, combined with mandatory jurisdiction at
the circuit court level, means that, for nearly all federal appel-
late litigants, their cases will end with a disposition by the
court of appeals. Specifically, the federal courts of appeals
resolved nearly 25,000 cases on the merits for the year ending
September 1998,81 while the Supreme Court in its 1998-1999
Term chose to review only seventy cases arising from the fed-
eral circuit courts.82 Put simply, for the vast majority of liti-
gants, the court of appeals will be the last court to evaluate
their arguments and pass judgment on their cases.83
The role of the federal circuit courts as effective courts of
last resort impacts both the courts' error-correcting function
and its law-making function. The reality that the court of ap-
peals represents the last forum for error-correction in the vast
majority of cases affects not only the litigants, who realize that
they realistically have only one appellate forum in which to
press their claims, but also the circuit court judges, who realize
that they have a special obligation to try to achieve the best
possible resolution of every dispute. At the same time, final
review at the court of appeals level not only heightens the
importance of circuit courts' discharge of their error-correction
function, it also increases the significance of its law-making
function. Although the Supreme Court's decisions garner most
" See The Supreme Court, 1998 Term, The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400,
406-07, tbl. H (1999) [hereinafter Supreme Court Statistics).
80 See id.
" See 1998 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 22, at 52 tbl. S-1.
82 See Supreme Court Statistics, supra note 79, at 408 tbl. H(E).
' See Dragich, supra note 43, 766-77 (discussing the realities of the fact that
the circuit courts are "the de facto courts of last resort in the federal system").
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of the attention from the media and the academy, much of the
legal developments within the federal judiciary-the evolution
of doctrines old and new through innovations and retrench-
ments in statutory interpretation and constitutional analy-
sis-occurs not at the Supreme Court but within the courts of
appeals." The circuit courts are almost always the first appel-
late voice on the panoply of legal issues that occupy the federal
courts,85 and on many issues they remain-at least for a sub-
stantial period of time-the only appellate voice.
3. Three-Judge Panels
In contrast to the Supreme Court, in which almost all
decisions are rendered by a full court of nine Justices,"8 the
courts of appeals do most of their work in panels of three judg-
es. While each Supreme Court Justice has an opportunity to
contribute her or his voice in every case before the High Court,
nearly all of the decisions rendered by the federal circuit court
are the product not of the whole court, but of a randomly se-
lected group of three judges who purport to speak for the en-
tire court."7 Thus, except for those relatively rare instances
when a case is considered en banc, 5 only a minority (and of-
"' See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to
Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 213 (1999) (noting that the "U.S.
Courts of Appeals . . . effectively have become [not only] the courts of last resort
for most litigants [but also] the source of doctrinal development for most legal
issues").
" In a few settings with cases involving certain subject matters--e.g., bank-
ruptcy proceedings, some administrative matters-the existence of specialized tribu-
nals sometimes creates a layer of appellate review that precedes review in the
federal courts of appeals.
" Examples of instances in which a Court of fewer than nine Justices may
render a decision include a vacancy on the bench, an illness of a Justice, and a
recusal of a Justice for real or perceived conflict of interest.
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2000) (permitting the courts of appeals to hear and
determine cases by separate panels consisting of three judges).
' 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) provides generally for en banc review. Although each Cir-
cuit has adopted its own particular procedural requirements for initiating en banc
review or re-hearing, the subject of en banc review is dealt with generally by Fed-
eral Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. Rule 35(a) states: "An en banc hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en bane
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions;
or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Rule 35(a)
provides that a majority of the judges in active service may order that an appeal
or proceeding be heard en banc. Rule 35(b) requires that a party seeking en banc
20001
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
ten a very small minority) of a circuit's active judges directly
participate in the adjudication of each particular case. 89 More-
over, because panels will often include a senior judge, a judge
from another circuit, or even a district court judge sitting by
designation, it is not uncommon for only two or even just one
active judge of the circuit to participate in the resolution of
certain cases. °
The critical (and yet rarely discussed) fact that only a
small percentage of the active judges of a circuit actually hear
any individual case has a profound impact on both the error-
correction and law-making functions of the courts of appeals.
Both when looking backward to correct claimed errors and
when looking forward to develop the law, the courts of appeals
necessarily operate in a fractured manner and thus necessarily
assess claims of errors with a fractured viewpoint and speak
with a fractured voice. Only when a court of appeals considers
a case en banc can the litigant seeking correction of an error
below, or the actors and courts seeking future legal guidance,
be confident that the views, insights, and judgments of all the
members of the circuit court were brought to bear on a particu-
lar case.
review of a panel decision must state that the petition is necessary to address a
conflict in the law between the circuit and the Supreme Court, or within the cir-
cuit itself, or that the appeal involves questions of "exceptional importance."
Ninth Circuit Rule 35-3 permits for a limited en banc court. The Rule states
that the en banc court shall consist of the chief judge of the circuit and ten addi-
tional judges to be chosen by lot from the active judges of the court. See 9th Cir.
R. 35-3.
"' As detailed before, the circuits range in size from six to twenty-eight judges.
See supra note 28.
Thus, assuming that all of the circuit's seats were filled, a panel of three
judges would represent at most one-half and as little as eleven percent of the
circuit's active judges. The existence of vacancies would improve these numbers
somewhat. See Federal Judiciary Homepage, Vacancy List by Circuit and District
Report, at http'//www.uscourts.gov/vacancies/judgevacancy.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2000) (reporting twenty vacancies and fourteen pending nominations for the federal
courts of appeals as of September 1, 2000). Vacancies within a circuit, however,
would also be likely to increase the number of panels that are not composed en-
tirely of active circuit judges. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
" For the year ending in September 1998, nearly twenty-five percent of the
judges participating in dispositions were either senior or visiting judges. In a num-
ber of circuits, this percentage exceeded thirty percent, and in the Second Circuit,
it approached fifty percent. See 1998 JUDiCIAL BuSINEss, supra note 22, Table S-2.
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4. Self-Binding Precedents
It is well-established precedent in every circuit that one
panel's reported holding can only be overruled through en banc
procedures in which all of the active judges in the court partic-
ipate.9 Thus, while only a fraction of the active judges on the
court are involved in most circuit court decisions, those deci-
sions have, in a sense, more precedential weight than decisions
rendered by other courts within the federal judiciary. A deci-
sion by a federal district court is not thought to have any bind-
ing force in future cases92; decisions by the Supreme Court,
though binding on the courts of appeals and the district courts,
are subject to modification or outright reversal by the justices
themselves (limited only by the degree of respect they hold for
the doctrine of stare decisis). But at the appellate level, the
entire court considers and holds itself bound in all future cases
by the decision of a prior panel. That the circuits generally
require review by the entire court sitting en banc-a procedure
that the courts of appeals collectively employ no more fre-
quently than the Supreme Court accepts certiorari93-- to re-
9 Panels in each circuit have consistently stated that they lack the authority
to overrule decisions by prior panels; thus, as a general matter, a panel's decision
binds subsequent panels absent an intervening decision of the Supreme Court, act
of Congress, or en banc decision by the court as a whole. See, e.g., Dantzler v.
IRS, 183 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 1999); Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474,
476 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ortega, 150 F.3d 937, 947 (8th Cir. 1998);
Barber v. Johnson, 145 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Nicholas,
133 F.3d 133, 136 (1st Cir. 1998); Ritz Carlton Hotel Co. v. NLRB, 123 F.3d 760,
765 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); Roundy v. Commissioner, 122 F.3d 835, 837 (9th Cir.
1997); Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Moore v.
Office of Personnel Mgmt., 113 F.3d 216, 218 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v.
Foster, 104 F.3d 1228, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Skupniewitz, 73 F.3d 702, 705
(7th Cir. 1996); Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1993); Etheridge v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 9 F.3d 1087, 1090 (4th Cir. 1993); see also 3RD CM.
INT. OP. PROC. 9.1 ("It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in
a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel
overrules the holding in a published opinion of a previous panel. Court en banc
consideration is required to do so.").
' See, e.g., Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993) ("A district court
decision binds no judge in any other case, save to the extent that doctrines of
preclusion (not stare decisis) apply.").
"3 For the year ending in September, 1998, there were a total of only eighty
three en banc dispositions out of nearly 25,000 appeals terminated on the merits.
See 1998 JuDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 22, Table S-1.
Notably, several circuits observe practices, established with varying degrees of
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verse a panel's precedent has a fundamental impact on the
circuit courts' discharge of their error-correction and law-mak-
ing functions. Given the rarity of en banc review, each three-
judge panel's decision not only purports to represent the entire
court in the case at hand, but it also commands the allegiance
of all future panels in the consideration of subsequent cases.
This means that future panels, either looking backward to
correct perceived error or looking forward to shape the direc-
tion of legal change, are inextricably tied to the results and
reasoning set forth by prior panels in all prior cases.
C. The Collective Dilemma
Taken together, the tensions inherent in the dual obliga-
tions of error-correction and law-making combine with the
institutional structure of the federal courts of appeals to pro-
duce considerable difficulties for the sound and sensible devel-
opment of the law. Because of the courts' mandatory jurisdic-
tion and its error-correction obligations, litigants ultimately
determine both when and how cases are presented to the
courts of appeals. In other words, the error-correction function
of the federal circuits sets the agenda for, and the parameters
of, their decision-making. As a result, circuit judges will some-
times first confront novel or important legal issues within
cases that are factually or procedurally atypical, or which are
poorly developed, briefed, and argued by counsel. Accordingly,
circuit courts must unavoidably consider some consequential
legal questions in less-than-ideal contexts for the discharge of
their law-making functions. 4 And yet, because of the binding
formality, that permit one panel to overrule a decision of another-typically based
on an intervening decision of the Supreme Court or act of Congress-through
circulation of its opinion to the entire court. If a majority of the court does not
vote to hear the issue en banc, the later panel's analysis is permitted to displace
the former panel's approach. For example, Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) provides:
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position
which would overrule a prior decision of this court . .. shall not be pub-
lished unless it is first circulated among the active members of this court
and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of
whether the position should be adopted.
7th Cir. R. 40(e). Other circuits have adopted a simila" practice. See, e.g., United
States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing practice in Second
Circuit and others).
"' Cf. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking The Right to Appeal (More or Less) Serious-
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force given to circuit court precedents, early decisions rendered
in such imperfect settings may and often will establish how all
future cases raising the particular legal issue are litigated and
decided.
For these reasons, judges may quite justifiably be reluc-
tant in some cases to issue a firm and conclusive legal decision
for fear that they might harmfully "petrify" the precedential
framework for the consideration of future cases. A court may
realize that the imperfect context or imperfect manner in
which certain issues are raised in a particular case makes the
case an especially poor vehicle for the creation and develop-
ment of sound legal doctrine. And though obliged to render
decisions that discharge its error-correction function, an appel-
late court faced with such a case may sensibly seek to avoid or
limit the discharge of its law-making function.
Indeed, this reluctance to engage in law-making may be
reinforced by the fact that the federal courts of appeals operate
through three-judge panels, the decisions of which bind the
entire court. A three-judge panel that confronts a novel or
important legal issue probably should be quite reticent about
establishing a definitive precedent before other judges can
have some input. Such reticence might be based in a circuit
judge's general disinclination to speak for and to bind fellow
judges before having some inkling for their views, or based in a
circuit judge's candid appreciation that colleagues may be more
knowledgeable or familiar with a particular legal issue. Accord-
ingly, when a particular panel is forced to confront a conse-
quential legal issue in a less-than-ideal context, the case for
consciously avoiding the issuance of a firm and conclusive legal
decision becomes especially compelling.
Interestingly, though the institutional problems facing the
federal courts of appeals that create a concern about prema-
ture law-making are in large part an outgrowth of modern
expansion of the appellate caseload and the appellate bench,
the basic dilemma is very similar to the one that Alexander
Bickel, nearly four decades ago, saw facing the Supreme Court.
ly, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 69-71 (1985) (suggesting that allowing appellate courts to
select which cases to review might better serve their law-making function because
an "appellate court arguably is in the best position to determine whether, where,
when and how the law is in need of clarification or revision").
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As developed in Part IV, the solution, too, may lie, at least in
part, in the analysis and the methods that Bickel developed as
providing an answer for the Supreme Court: the passive vir-
tues.
IV. RECONCEIVING THE PASSIVE VIRTUES FOR THE COURTS OF
APPEALS
A. Defining the Passive Virtues
Alexander Bickel first described the passive virtues in a
1961 article95 and expanded his ideas in book-length form the
following year.9 6 Bickel's conception of the passive virtues
grew out of his perception of the Supreme Court's place in the
American system of government. In Bickel's view, the Supreme
Court, to function properly as a judicial body, had to decide
constitutional cases based on fundamental neutral princi-
ples-principles that not only resolved the case before the
Court but also could be applied broadly across a range of cas-
es.9" Decisions that did not rest on such broadly applicable
fundamental principles, Bickel believed, represented no more
than preferences among permissible policy alternatives, a role
that was constitutionally allocated to the legislature rather
than the judiciary.98 The need to rest its decisions on funda-
mental principles placed the Court in a difficult position, how-
ever, because it risked depriving the Court of flexibility in its
decision-making. Principle, Bickel asserted, was essential to
the functioning of a good society, but a good society could not
function in rigid adherence to principle.99 Yet pursuing a
course other than adherence to principle threatened to
delegitimize the Court's decision-making.
The Court's role in deciding constitutional cases created a
further difficulty. When the Court invalidated a piece of legis-
lation because the policy preferences embodied in the legisla-
" See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961).
See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
See id. at 50.
'8 See id. at 54.
See id. at 64.
[Vol. 66: 3
PASSIVE VIRTUES IN FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
tion exceeded the bounds of constitutional principle, the Court
played its proper role as the enunciator of principle. When the
Court determined that a particular piece of legislation repre-
sented a permissible policy decision, in contrast, the Court did
not, at least in theory, delegitimize other possible policy choic-
es. In other words, it did not transform Congress' determina-
tion of policy into fundamental principle. But because of the
Court's role in setting forth fundamental principles, Bickel
argued, the mere act of finding a statute constitutionally per-
missible had some tendency to legitimate the statute. Thus,
with the Court's imprimatur in place, the likelihood of recon-
sideration and reevaluation of policy alternatives by Congress
(and, to some degree, by the public) diminished.' 0
The Court faced a third difficulty as well: its role was to
enunciate general principles, yet, as Bickel recognized, it was
asked to do so within the context of individual cases. And there
was no guarantee that the first case to present a particular
issue would do so in an ideal setting. There might be some-
thing unusual about the factual setting of the case that would
lead the Court to enunciate the principle in a manner that
would complicate application in subsequent cases. Or the par-
ticular state law being challenged might speak to an issue
addressed by questionable statutes in other states as well, but
it does so in a distinctive way, again raising the possibility
that the Court's statement of principle would be shaped as
much by the anomalous quality of the particular statute as by
the underlying, fundamental issue. Or the case might arise at
an awkward time, either in the midst of an on-going political
debate that might well resolve the underlying issue in a man-
ner that would not require a declaration of constitutional prin-
ciple or following a long period of quiescence suggesting that
the statute did not reflect a contemporary or near-contempo-
rary political decision. Any of these peculiarities arising in the
individual case might lead the Court to an ill-considered enun-
ciation of principle and thus threaten the Court's constitutional
and popular legitimacy.
To Bickel, the passive virtues provided a way for the Court
to maintain its principled role while avoiding many of the
difficulties that its position within the governmental structure
"' See id. at 70.
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created.1"' Faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute,
the Court could void the statute as inconsistent with constitu-
tional principles, thereby defining boundaries of permissible
legislative action, or the Court could affirm the statute as
consistent with constitutional principles, thereby effectively
validating the statute in a way that would discourage further
legislative action.' °2 Or, Bickel argued, the Court could do
neither, instead deciding not to decide the case by relying on
one or more devices to dispose of the case without a resolution
on the merits.' 3
The devices that Bickel associated with the passive virtues
were not all of a type. Some were plainly discretionary mecha-
nisms, such as the Court's authority to accept or reject appeals
under its certiorari jurisdiction.' Some were constitutional
or quasi-constitutional doctrines in and of themselves: vague-
ness, delegation, political question, desuetude. These doctrines
permitted the Court to insist that the legislature (state or
federal) render a clear, contemporary decision on the policy
question at hand before the Court would entertain substantive
constitutional challenges. Finally, some were procedural devic-
es associated with the constitutional definition of what consti-
tuted a case or controversy, such as standing and ripeness.
These doctrines limited the ability of litigants to place difficult
constitutional issues before the Court, by assuring that the
litigants had concrete interests at stake and that the dispute
between the parties had matured to the point that the inter-
ests of one of the parties either faced imminent harm or had
already been harmed. Facially, these doctrines did not seem to
provide the Court with much flexibility, but Bickel read them
broadly to allow the Court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
not only in those cases in which standing and ripeness were
not present according to their traditional formulations, but also
..1 See Bickel, supra note 95, at 50-51.
1 See Bickel, supra note 95, at 48, 50; BICKEL, supra note 96, at 69, 129, 200-
03.
'o' See Bickel, supra note 95, at 50-51; BICKEL, supra note 96, at 69-71.
104 See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 126. The discretionary power to decline to
hear cases through denial of certiorari did not provide the Court with the full
measure of flexibility that Bickel desired. Until the 1988 amendments to the Judi-
cial Code, appeals from state supreme courts challenging the constitutionality of
state statutes fell within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, rather than its certiora-
ri jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(2) (repealed 1988).
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in those cases in which the issue presented to the Court did
not itself seem ripe.' Bickel recognized that the Supreme
Court did not have all of these passive devices available to it in
each case, but he conceived of these doctrines as malleable
enough to often give the Court the option of invoking one or
more as a means of avoiding a premature decision.0 6
Use of these devices would have two advantages in
Bickel's view. First, it would allow the Court to avoid prema-
ture resolution of issues, m6dng it more likely that by the
time a definitive decision was made the legal and factual con-
text would have been sharpened and the constitutional princi-
ple at issue would have come into focus."0 7 Second, the choice
of device, and the manner in which the Court applied the de-
vice, would encourage further exploration of the legal issue by
the political branches of government, and by the public at
large, possibly leading to additional legislative action that
would either eliminate the need for a constitutional decision or
frame the constitutional issue in more precise terms.' The
use of these devices, Bickel argued, would provide the Court
with a measure of flexibility that was essential to public accep-
tance of the Court's role as enunciator of constitutional princi-
ples.'0 9 These, then, were the passive virtues-passive, be-
cause they allowed the Court to avoid decision-making; virtues,
because by allowing the Court to avoid decisions in some cases,
these devices ultimately strengthened the Court's ability to
fulfill its constitutional duties and fostered important and
valuable institutional dialogues.
The virtues of the devices that Bickel championed were
not universally acclaimed. Gerald Gunther, in particular, was
highly critical of Bickel's work."0 Gunther was sympathetic
to Bickel's underlying premise-that the Court's decision-mak-
ing should rest on broadly applicable principles and should not
See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 123-24.
'¢ See id. at 170.
'o' See id. at 177.
108 See Bickel, supra note 95, at 50, 60; BICKEL, supra note 96, at 70-71, 146,
179.
" See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 204-06.
110 See generally Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues-A
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1964).
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yield to mere policy preferences."' Gunther also had little
quarrel with Bickel's invocation of the Brandeisian notions of
avoiding broad constitutional decisions by deciding the merits
on narrow, and if possible non-constitutional, grounds."'
Gunther was highly critical, however, of Bickel's proposed use
of jurisdictional devices as discretionary tools to evade decla-
rations of constitutional principle. Gunther complained that by
expanding the application of doctrines such as standing and
ripeness beyond their constitutional boundaries, Bickel re-
shaped their content, not because of anything intrinsic to the
doctrines themselves, but simply so that they could better
serve as means to an end, the avoidance of premature constitu-
tional decision-making."3 Gunther also asserted that by
treating the Court's appellate jurisdiction as discretionary-
similar if not identical to certiorari-Bickel failed to take seri-
ously Congress' legislative definition of the Court's jurisdic-
tion."' Finally, Gunther feared that Bickel's approach, when
put to the test, was open to cynical manipulation so as to avoid
undesirable substantive results."5 Gunther recognized that
the use of the passive virtues could and likely would be highly
dependent on the Court majority's view of the merits of the
case, resulting in not simply a distortion of the law defining
the mechanisms that constituted the passive virtues, but also a
distortion of the substantive constitutional law that the passive
virtues were meant to protect."6
... See id. at 5.
..2 See id. at 16-17. Gunther did, however, express concern that the effort to
avoid constitutional decisions would cause courts to distort their methods of statu-
tory interpretation, and thereby compromise non-constitutional substantive law. See
id. at 21.
1 See id. at 9-10.
11 Gunther, supra note 110, at 11-12, 16. In asserting that the Court's appel-
late jurisdiction, like its certiorari jurisdiction, permitted a measure of discretion,
Bickel relied in part on a remark by Chief Justice Warren that the distinction
between appellate and certiorari jurisdiction was one of degree, not of kind. See
BICKEL, supra note 96, at 126 (quoting Chief Justice Warrens statement at an
ALI Annual Meeting that it "is only accurate to a degree to say that our jurisdic-
tion in cases on appeal is obligatory as distinguished from discretionary on certio-
rari"). Gunther contended that Bickel misinterpreted the Chief Justice's comment,
which, Gunther argued, was directed only at the question of whether oral argu-
ment was available as of right. See Gunther, supra note 110, at 11.
11 Id. at 14-16.
... Id. at 20-24.
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Any assessment of Bickel's description of the passive vir-
tues, and the criticism that it provoked, must recognize that
Bickel's work was very much a creature of its time. Bickel
wrote against a backdrop of controversial cases, many dealing
with race relations issues-segregation statutes,
antimiscegenation statutes, and the like-that provoked pas-
sionate responses from large segments of the public."7 While
hostility to desegregation had many targets, a good measure of
the verbal backlash (if not the physical violence) was directed
against the Court itself. With the outright rejection of the
Court's authority as constitutional arbiter a very real threat in
certain parts of the country, it was understandable that Bickel
would look for devices to enable the Court to resolve the cases
before it while maintaining a balance between principle and
expediency that would allow it to continue its constitutional
function with the consent of the governed.
While the tumult of the early civil rights era that inspired
Bickel's conception of the passive virtues has passed, statutory
changes to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction have rendered the
passive virtues, as Bickel conceived them, largely superfluous.
At the time Bickel wrote, the Supreme Court had mandatory
appellate jurisdiction over judgments that invalidated federal
or state statutes as unconstitutional."' In this setting, Bickel
saw the passive virtues as an important safety valve that
would allow the high court to avoid exercising its constitution-
al law-making function in settings where a Supreme Court
decision on the merits would either present too great a depar-
ture from public sentiment (if the Court declared the statute
unconstitutional) or risk legitimating what the Court saw as
inadvisable legislation (if the Court held the statute consti-
... Bickel himself recognized that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and its companion cases-the legal and procedural issues that they raised
and the resistance that they met in the South-were central to his analysis of the
Supreme Court's institutional role and proper functioning. See BICKEL, supra note
96, at 244. Bickel also analyzed cases involving sit-ins at lunch counters, see
BICKEL, supra note 96, at 175-80 (addressing Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157
(1961)), and anti-miscegenation statutes. See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 174 (noting
with approval the Court's dismissal of a challenge to such a statute in Naim v.
Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956)).
I" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(2) (repealed 1988). See generally Bennett Boskey
& Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 121
F.R.D. 81 (1988).
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tutional)."9 The Supreme Court no longer faces the conun-
drum that Bickel identified, however. In 1988, Congress
amended the Judicial Code to eliminate virtually all of the
Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction and placed within the
Court's certiorari jurisdiction those appeals that previously the
Court had lacked the discretion to refuse. 2 ' To the extent
that the Court wishes to avoid premature constitutional resolu-
tion of a controversial question, the Court now has the means
to do so simply by denying certiorari.
B. The Need and Opportunities for Passive Virtues in the
Courts of Appeals
Though Bickel's conception of the passive virtues was
uniquely a product of its time, Bickel's general concerns have
an enduring resonance. As others have noted, Cass Sunstein's
recent advocacy of "decisional minimalism'--i.e., judicial ef-
forts to keep judgments "shallow and narrow" as a means to
fortify democratic processes ...-- is a direct progeny of Bickel's
ideas.122 More to the point of this Article, Bickel's core
themes now find particular relevance in an arena that Bickel
himself did not explore-the work of the federal courts of ap-
peals. Though the Supreme Court can now completely control
its docket through the exercise of its certiorari power, the cir-
cuit courts' mandatory jurisdiction saddles them with a case-
load and a docket that is determined entirely by the litigants
and not by the courts. Thus, in every case brought to them, the
courts of appeals must continually confront the difficulties of,
and inherent tension between, their dual obligations of law-
making and error-correction. Moreover, the massive caseload
increase in the courts of appeals and the corresponding in-
crease in the number of judges within each circuit have height-
ened the challenges that these dual obligations pose for indi-
119 See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 69-72.
121 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257 (2000).
121 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE
CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
" See Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1971,
1972-74 (1999) (reviewing SUNSTEIN, supra note 121) (suggesting that Sunstein's
ideas are linked more closely to Bickel's than Sunstein himself acknowledges).
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vidual judges and for circuit courts as institutions. As a result,
jurists on the federal courts of appeals, both individually and
collectively, have a special need for the sort of decisional flexi-
bility-for means to balance concerns of principle and expedi-
ency-that Bickel was seeking to create for the Supreme Court
through his articulation of the passive virtues.
When acting in their law-making capacity, circuit judges
must be aware and concerned with matters of principle, be-
cause the rules they set forth will be applied broadly beyond
the context of the individual litigation in which those rules are
first announced and developed. And yet, concerns of expediency
cannot be avoided in the course of such law-making, because
the reality is that not every case that the courts of appeals are
required to adjudicate provides a useful or appropriate vehicle
for the effective annunciation of sound legal rules. The circuit
courts' obligation to correct errors in the face of a massive
caseload likewise creates the need for balance of principle and
expediency: the courts must endeavor to reach a principled
resolution of every appeal, but they must also do so efficiently
and rapidly if they are to be able to have the time needed to
determine exactly what result principle calls for in the massive
number of cases they are called upon to adjudicate.
Moreover, as stressed before, the dual obligations of error-
correction and law-making create competing demands while
being inextricably linked." Because appellate courts' devel-
opment of the law is significantly affected by the order and the
manner in which individual cases come before the court, and
because the error-correction function of the federal circuits sets
the agenda for, and the parameters of, their decision-making,
circuit judges will sometimes first confront novel or important
legal issues within cases that are factually or procedurally
atypical or that are poorly developed, briefed, and argued by
counsel. Consequently, with circuits courts unavoidably forced
to consider some consequential legal questions in less-than-
ideal contexts for law-making and yet governed by the binding
force given to circuit court precedents, Bickel's development of
the importance of avoiding premature law-making takes on a
special bent for circuit court judges. That is, the institutional
realities that confront the courts of appeals make even more
"2 See supra Part III.A.
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acute their need to balance principle and expediency. An appel-
late panel, confronted with a novel legal issue, is in a difficult
position. Pursuant to its jurisdictional mandate, it must decide
the case before it. If it does so by the traditional means of a
published opinion, however, it will create legal doctrine for the
circuit, even though its decision will be based on the incom-
plete picture created by the particular facts of the individual
case and even though only a minority-frequently, a small
minority-of the active judges in the circuit will have partici-
pated in the decision.
At first blush, it may appear that judges on the federal
courts of appeals have few real options for effectively and ap-
propriately avoiding definitive judgments while still facilitating
a legal dialogue on an issue raised in an appeal. The passive
virtues as Bickel conceived them-jurisdictional devices used
as a means of avoiding decisions on the merits-are unlikely to
regularly provide an appropriate escape from this dilemma:
assuming that all of the elements of a justiciable case or con-
troversy are present, the parties to the dispute are entitled to
a resolution, not to an avoidance. Having to render decisions in
every case that comes before them as a reviewing court with
mandatory jurisdiction, the circuit courts often appear to have
no real decisional flexibility.
But, with the context and institutional dynamics altered,
Bickel's core insights about the value of judges seeking to
avoid premature law-making and to facilitate effective legal
dialogues still can and should merit special consideration; upon
reflection and analysis of the complex and often subtle realities
of circuit court adjudications, one discovers that the courts of
appeals may in fact have a range of mechanisms at their dis-
posal that can enable them to be passively virtuous. Specifi-
cally, there are both substantive doctrines and procedural
mechanisms by which the courts may be able to effectively
engage in their law-making function in a more ordered man-
ner, while simultaneously performing their jurisdictional obli-
gation to correct errors in individual cases. 24 The tension be-
tween the circuit court's error-correction and law-making func-
tions is, in the end, a product of their different goals. In a
sense, a court's error-correction function is concerned almost
214 See infra Part IV.B.I.
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exclusively with results, not process, with ends, not means.
Thus, it is fair to say that a circuit court's error-correction obli-
gation is faithfully discharged when it reaches and renders
what it genuinely believes to be the proper result in the case at
hand." In contrast, a circuit court's law-making function is
fundamentally concerned with means and process. Regardless
of the specific result reached in any individual case, what mat-
ters is the route taken to that result, because it is the content
of that route-what is said and what is not said in any opinion
that justifies the outcome reached-which comprises and de-
fines the court's discharge of its law-making obligation.
Understood in these terms, the possibilities for the federal
courts of appeals to effectively avoid unwise discharges of its
law-making function while still being faithful to its error-cor-
rection function start to come into focus. As long as the circuit
court panel arrives at a final result that it views as just, the
court has fully and faithfully fulfilled its error-correction func-
tion; the court then can, and we suggest should, tailor its
means and methods for rendering that result with a view to-
ward best effectuating its law-making function.
1. Avoidance Mechanisms Enabling Circuit Courts to be
Passive, if not Virtuous
As detailed below, there are some mechanisms through
which courts of appeals can achieve just results that allow
them to completely avoid, at least with respect to some issues,
rendering on-the-record decisions. These avoidance mecha-
nisms have Bickelian value as "passive" because they enable a
circuit court to defer a final and confining pronouncement on a
particular issue, though they are not clearly virtuous because
they do not readily afford a means to enhance important legal
dialogues. Nevertheless, as long as these mechanisms are not
stretched to the point of abuse, they are important and valu-
able devices for circuit courts to avoid making premature pre-
cedents.
125 In this context, the means to that result-e.g., whether the court hears argu-
ment and carefully reviews the briefs; how the court justifies its ruling-will often
be of some instrumental value in ensuring for the court itself, for the parties, and
for observers that a proper result was indeed achieved. But, with regard to the
error-correction function, it is the final result which is of fundamental significance.
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a. Appeals with Multiple Issues
In describing the passive virtues, Bickel drew heavily on
Justice Brandeis' discussion of how substantive constitutional
decision-making could and should be avoided through the con-
sideration of alternative substantive grounds that would re-
solve cases on the merits.126 The idea that the Court should
rest its decision on the Constitution only when necessary, and
rely on statutory or common law grounds as the basis for deci-
sion where those authorities may properly be invoked, has a
long lineage and is by now thoroughly ingrained in this
country's jurisprudence. Even Gunther, Bickel's harshest con-
temporary critic, found this idea unobjectionable, so long as the
Court is forthright in its application of statutory or common
law and does not distort the substance of the law for the pur-
pose of avoiding a constitutional decision-in other words, as
long as the Court is not using the statutory or common law
purely as the means to a particular end. 1
The strategy of resorting to alternative grounds for a deci-
sion, which the Supreme Court historically has invoked for
avoiding unnecessary constitutional law-making, will often be
available as a means for the courts of appeals to avoid impru-
dent law-making in appeals raising multiple issues. Indeed,
this strategy may be available more frequently in the courts of
appeals than in the Supreme Court. Unlike the Supreme
Court, which accepts certiorari on particular issues and there-
fore effectively limits its grounds for decision even before it
directly confronts the merits, the courts of appeals confront
issues defined by the parties. And when the parties frame the
issues for appeal, it is quite common for them to raise multiple
issues, any one of which might allow the court to dispose of the
appeal in its entirety. An appellate panel confronted with a
novel or difficult issue, or an issue presented in a peculiar way
within the setting of the particular case, may well be able to
avoid resolution of the issue by turning to alternative grounds
126 Justice Brandeis provided his most complete account of the "rules under
which [the Supreme Court] has avoided passing upon a large part of all the con-
stitutional questions pressed upon it for decision" in his renowned concurring opin-
ion in Ashwander v. TVA. See 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
" See Gunther, supra note 110, at 16-17.
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for decision. Provided that the panel does not twist one area of
the law to avoid a decision in another, there is no reason to
object if the court refuses to decide all of the issues presented
on appeal. Indeed, our suggestion is that courts embrace such
avoidance opportunities if and when they are fairly presented
and enable the fulfillment of the error-correction function with-
out forcing a discharge of law-making responsibilities in an
imperfect context.
b. Waiver and Other Procedural Devices
Bickel's discussions of the procedural doctrines of standing
and ripeness also had their root in Justice Brandeis' ideas, al-
though Bickel arguably took those doctrines farther than Jus-
tice Brandeis would have permitted. The very same doctrines
that Justice Brandeis described, and upon which Bickel elabo-
rated, may properly be considered when a case is before a
circuit court, just as they may be considered by the Supreme
Court. To these may be added other doctrines that cumulative-
ly set limits on the jurisdiction of the federal appellate courts.
These would include the requirement that the party bringing
the appeal have lost in the district court, as well as the re-
quirement that the case have been brought to a final judg-
ment. 8 The appellate panel may also consider quasi-jurisdic-
tional doctrines such as waiver-the requirement that, to be an
appropriate subject of appeal, an issue must have been proper-
ly submitted to the district court. If any of these requirements
is not met, then the appellate court may-indeed,
must--dismiss, and thereby avoid a decision on the merits.
Moreover, these issues may appropriately be raised sua sponte
by the panel, as they go to the question of whether the court
has authority to decide the question or questions before it.
"n See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). This requirement does not apply, of course, to
interlocutory appeals. Such an appeal, however, may only be brought if both the
district court and the appellate panel conclude that an immediate appeal would
materially advance the ultimate resolution of the case and would otherwise be
appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also supra note 74 (discussing the rules
governing interlocutory appeals). In other words, unlike the vast majority of ap-
peals, interlocutory appeals may be brought only at the discretion of the appellate
panel. In this context, the federal courts of appeals have a discretionary authority
that is largely akin to the Supreme Court's certiorari power, and thus there is
little need for avoidance devices other than simple denial of leave to appeal.
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2. The Importance of Mechanisms that Also Enhance
Dialogue
Until this point, this Article principally discussed avoid-
ance mechanisms that are available to the courts of appeals,
devices that are simply "passive" in that they permit the appel-
late courts to evade the resolution of difficult or novel issues of
law in less-than-ideal settings. But Bickel's vision and elabora-
tion of the passive virtues encompassed more than avoidance.
Bickel developed and advocated his devices as "virtues" be-
cause they operated to promote dialogue at multiple levels:
between the federal judiciary and the other branches of the
federal government, between the federal judiciary and the
state governments, between the public at large and the various
organs of state and federal government. The Supreme Court,
Bickel believed, was uniquely positioned to promote this type
of dialogue because of its place at the top of the nation's judi-
ciary and its designation as the ultimate arbiter of constitu-
tional principles-when the Court speaks, it garners the at-
tention of, and prompts responses from, the other branches of
government and the people governed.'29
The appellate courts have considerably less authority to
compel, or even to inspire, such dialogue within other branches
of government or among the electorate. The multitude of appel-
late voices across the twelve geographic circuits diminishes the
likelihood that the decision of any one court will provoke a
meaningful reaction from Congress, the executive, or the pub-
lic. A circuit might be thought to have a greater ability to elicit
responses from the governments of the states that make up the
circuit, as those state governments will have to respond to the
circuit's pronouncements of federal constitutional law insofar
as they affect state law. Even here, however, the dialogue-
promoting abilities of the circuit will be diminished: given the
reality of diversity jurisdiction, the mobility of modern society,
and the breadth of the Court's jurisprudence of personal juris-
diction, it will not be uncommon for the appellate court in one
circuit to have to address the law of a state outside its circuit
boundaries. The appellate courts' ability to inspire inter-insti-
tutional dialogue is also reduced by the breadth of the issues
129 See BICKEL, supra note 96, at 188.
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that they confront. Although the Supreme Court addresses a
variety of issues, constitutional questions-those that might be
expected to command the most attention from other govern-
ment entities and from the public-comprise a
disproportionately large portion of its docket. The courts of
appeals, in contrast, must address all manner of federal laws
as well as routine state law matters arising through diversity
jurisdiction. This is not to say that the courts of appeals are
entirely unable to generate meaningful responses from other
government entities. Particularly in a subject area where the
government is a repeat litigant, an appellate decision, creating
binding authority within the circuit, may well inspire the exec-
utive to press for legislative change, or at least for review by
the Supreme Court. Despite these opportunities, however,
promoting inter-institutional dialogue generally is not, and
cannot be, a principal objective of the appellate courts.
If inter-institutional dialogue is less important at the ap-
pellate level than it is at the Supreme Court, however, intra-
institutional dialogue takes on an enhanced importance. Intra-
court dialogue presents no great difficulties at the Supreme
Court. The Justices maintain their chambers in a single build-
ing; except where a Justice is required to recuse herself, they
all hear every case that comes before the Court and each has
formal and informal opportunities to have her views considered
before a decision of the Court is finalized. At the appellate
level, however, such opportunities are greatly reduced. The
individual judges within a circuit are free to maintain their
chambers in cities other than the one in which the central
court offices are located, thus reducing the opportunities for
regular, informal communication. Moreover, as we have
stressed (in part because it is a key feature of circuit court
decision-making that is rarely discussed), each judge does not
participate in every decision, or even most decisions, of her
circuit. Unless and until a case is heard en banc, no more than
three active judges of a circuit-and typically only two and
sometimes just one of the court's active judges-takes part in
the decision-making of the court. The ability of an individual
judge to make her views known, and to have those views con-
sidered within the context of an individual case before a legal
issue is resolved-and binding circuit precedent is created-is
therefore quite limited.
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These realities highlight the need for mechanisms that can
promote intra-court dialogue within the federal courts of ap-
peals. Such a dialogue, which would increase the likelihood
that a particular precedent would have the support of at least
a majority of the circuit's active judges, seems critical to ensur-
ing that the controlling "law of the circuit" set forth in each
published decision really represents just that. Such a mecha-
nism does exist and, with proper usage, has the potential to
alleviate the dilemmas imposed on the courts of appeals by the
institutional structure of the federal judiciary. That mecha-
nism is one that, to this point, has been regarded chiefly as
little more than a time- and paper-saving device: the unpub-
lished opinion.
3. The Passive Virtue of the Unpublished Opinion
The use of unpublished opinions began in the early 1970s
as part of the wave of reform and structural changes in the
courts that followed the dramatic expansion of the appellate
dockets in the 1960s. And the use of unpublished opinions has
proven to be among the more controversial reforms that the
courts have adopted.1 ° The controversy arises principally,
however, from an incomplete vision of unpublished opinions,
which in turn stems from an incomplete conception of the ap-
pellate courts' institutional role. When considered within the
context of the structural constraints on the courts' of appeals
functioning, the unpublished opinion emerges as an exemplar
of the passive virtues, perhaps a more powerful mechanism for
improving decision-making at the appellate level than any of
the techniques Bickel described for the Supreme Court.
a. The Unpublished Opinion as an Avoidance Device
Imagine a court of appeals panel facing a novel and diffi-
cult issue of statutory interpretation. Pursuant to the court's
statutorily imposed jurisdiction and its error-correction func-
tion, the court is obliged to resolve the case before it. Imagine,
too, that no alternative issue will allow a resolution on the
merits and that the members of the panel conclude that they
"' See generally sources cited supra note 43.
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cannot, in good conscience, invoke an avoidance mechanism,
such as standing, ripeness, or waiver, because the require-
ments of those doctrines are not met. There thus seems to be
no way to avoid a resolution on the merits, one that will re-
quire the panel to resolve the statutory issue. And yet, while
the members of the panel tentatively agree on an approach to
the question, and one member of the panel drafts an opinion
embodying the agreed-upon approach, the members of the
panel are uncertain whether their approach constitutes the
best or most thoroughly reasoned approach. Under traditional
doctrine, if the panel publishes its opinion, the approach that
the opinion describes becomes the law of the circuit, despite
the judges' uncertainty about the wisdom of their conclusion.
One or more of the judges may express that uncertainty in a
concurring opinion, yet, in the absence of en banc review by
the entire court-a highly unlikely proposition-the decision
stands as binding authority, both for the judges on the panel
and for the other judges within the circuit. To be sure, the
panel's opinion may play a role in the development of the law
elsewhere-other circuits will remain free to challenge, to ex-
pand upon, to learn from and adopt or depart from the original
panel decision. But the law in the initial panel's circuit will
effectively be frozen, despite the tentative nature of the deci-
sion. The unpublished opinion-which is not considered a bind-
ing precedent under local circuit rules-provides an escape
from the dilemma faced by a panel in this kind of situation. By
deciding the case by means of an unpublished opinion, the
panel may fulfill its error-correction function while maintain-
ing flexibility in its law-making function.
It must be acknowledged that it is just this aspect of the
unpublished opinion that provokes much of the criticism lev-
eled against unpublished opinions. Critics contend that an
appellate court that reaches a decision in a particular case
without a willingness to state firm legal principles (and know-
ing that such principles will be followed in other cases that the
court decides) is, in effect, acting in an unprincipled
manner.1"' There is something to this criticism, but only be-
cause of the way unpublished opinions presently are treated.
,.. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 31, at 944-46; Dragich, supra note 43, at 785-
800; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 291-92; Rebel, supra note 43, at 945.
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Currently, in six jurisdictions, unpublished opinions are not
precedent in any form: they may not be cited in briefs or argu-
ments to the court, except for the very limited purpose of es-
tablishing claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or law of the
case."3 2 In other jurisdictions, unpublished opinions are rec-
ognized as persuasive authority and may be cited to the court.
Even in these jurisdictions, however, reliance on unpublished
opinions is discouraged; lawyers typically are admonished to
use unpublished opinions only if they believe that no other
opinion of the court will serve as well. 33 Thus, while present-
ly, as a formal matter, unpublished opinions may serve as a
means of fulfilling the court's error-correction function, they
play little or no role when the court turns to law-making.
Under these circumstances, judges- may on occasion be
tempted to resolve a particular case in a way that they would
not care to see carried over into other cases. To put it bluntly,
they may be willing to decide an individual case in an unprin-
cipled manner. Although judges are of course unwilling to state
that any particular case has been decided in an unprincipled
manner, some do acknowledge the possibility, or at least the
appearance of the possibility.' This difficulty is alleviated,
to a large degree, if not entirely, to the extent that the opin-
ions are citable: judges are less likely to engage in legal flights
of fancy if they know that they may be confronted with their
decisions in subsequent cases.1 35 Given the present judicial
culture, however, which tends to regard citation of unpublished
opinions with a measure of disdain even in those jurisdictions
where citation is allowed, the problem is not entirely eliminat-
ed. Some change, not merely in formal citation rules, but also
more generally in the esteem in which judges hold unpublished
12 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
" See id.
,3 See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESs 219, 223 (1999) (noting that the use of unpublished opinions
allows judges who wish to reach a certain result, but who have trouble justifying
the result under the law, to attain the desired end while avoiding the difficulties).
" Even in those jurisdictions that do not permit citation to unpublished opin-
ions, the mere fact that those opinions are available to the bar and to the public
through the commercial online research services may lessen the likelihood that
unpublished opinions will be abused. As of September 2000, only three cir-
cuits-the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh-do not make their unpublished opinions
available to LEXIS or Westlaw.
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opinions, would seem necessary if the criticisms voiced by
those who oppose unpublished opinions are to be met. Such a
change is possible, however, once it is recognized that there is
an additional function that unpublished opinions can play, one
that draws on Bickel's conception of the passive virtues not
merely as avoidance devices, but also as dialogue-enhancing
devices.
b. The Unpublished Opinion as a Dialogue-Enhancing Device
Rules that allow citation of unpublished opinions, already
in place in seven circuits, open the possibility that unpublished
opinions might serve as more than avoidance devices. Through
the use of an unpublished opinion, a panel confronting a novel
or difficult issue can avoid the premature establishment of firm
circuit precedent, but, as importantly, the panel may also com-
municate its views to future panels that will confront the is-
sue. The initial unpublished opinion thus has the potential to
initiate a process in which panels communicate with each
other across time and across factual settings. At some point, of
course-and perhaps sooner rather than later-a panel will be
sufficiently confident of its resolution of the novel or difficult
issue to embody its decision in a published opinion, thereby
establishing new binding authority. The use of unpublished
opinions by prior panels, however, means that by the time this
occurs, other judges from the circuit, and not just those who
participate in the published opinion, will have had the opportu-
nity to make their views known, and the panel writing the
published opinion will have had the opportunity to view the
operation of possible conclusions in more than one factual
setting. The potential therefore exists for a more considered,
more nuanced resolution than would have been likely had the
initial panel to confront the issue been compelled to create
binding authority on the one hand, or to issue an uncitable
opinion on the other.
At least in those circuits where citation of unpublished
opinions is permitted, the use of unpublished opinions as a
dialogue-enhancing mechanism would require little more than
a subtle shift in judicial attitude. To this point, unpublished
opinions have commanded little respect in subsequent cases
and are only rarely cited in published opinions. This may in
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part simply be a matter of the use to which unpublished opin-
ions are most commonly put. Many unpublished opinions do
not involve novel or complex issues, but rather represent
straightforward applications of clear, binding authority. Little
would be gained by citing these opinions, as the legal rules
that they apply are set forth more fully in other, published
opinions. In those relatively few instances where unpublished
opinions do set forth careful analysis of complex issues, the
reason for disregarding those opinions is harder to surmise. It
cannot be simply that the unpublished opinions do not repre-
sent binding authority. Appellate decisions routinely cite the
decisions of panels in other circuits, although those opinions
have no binding authority outside the circuits in which they
were decided. And while it might be said that published opin-
ions from other circuits at least have binding authority some-
where, and are entitled to some respect as a result, appellate
decisions also frequently cite district court opinions, which do
not establish law in a formal sense and only have value insofar
as they are found persuasive. In this respect, an unpublished
appellate opinion might be thought to be similar to a district
court opinion: it derives its value from the persuasive force of
its reasoning. Where an unpublished opinion originated from
the same circuit as the subsequent panel, however, the unpub-
lished opinion is entitled to more consideration than a district
court opinion: it represents the considered judgment of mem-
bers of the same court, and thus it is entitled to consideration
by those who would speak with the court's authority.
The unpublished opinion, then, can in many ways accom-
plish for the courts of appeals what Bickel hoped his passive
virtues would achieve for the Supreme Court. It allows the
circuit court to avoid premature decision-making in less than
ideal circumstances and can also foster a valuable form of legal
dialogue. Moreover, an unpublished opinion can achieve these
ends without requiring a circuit court to distort either the
existing substantive law or the reach of the various procedural
avoidance devices, as critics of Bickel claimed his vision of the
passive virtues required. The unpublished opinion allows cir-
cuit court panels to fulfill its error-correction function faithfully
in every case, while facilitating an enhanced dialogue among
members of the court, across a range of factual settings, during
the process of formulating legal rules. The end result is that,
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while the fulfillment of the error-correction function will help-
fully shape the direction of the court's law-making, it will not
harmfully control the court's law-making agenda.
c. Integrating Unpublished Opinions with Other
Mechanisms for Collective Circuit Court
Decision-Making
The unpublished opinion is not, of course, the only means
of promoting the sort of intra-circuit dialogue that is needed
for effective and collective circuit court decision-making. In
fact, there are two other mechanisms formally recognized in
court rules: the rehearing of a case by the circuit court en banc
and the displacement of existing circuit precedent through
circulation of a new opinion to all active members of the court.
The en banc procedure is statutorily based,13 and it is de-
scribed in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as
various local rules of the individual circuits.'37 The displace-
ment of precedent through circulation of opinions has a less
exalted pedigree, but it nevertheless does appear in formal
rules of several circuits and appears to be well established as a
matter of custom in others.'38
Each of these formal mechanisms, however, is substantial-
ly limited in its ability to promote effective intra-circuit dia-
logue. Moreover, the limitations of the en banc and circulation
mechanisms is offset by the advantages of unpublished opin-
ions, while the difficulties presented by unpublished opinions
as dialogue-enhancers are offset by the strengths of the en
banc and circulation procedures. Unpublished opinions thus
serve as an ideal supplement to existing mechanisms for collec-
tive decision-making in the courts of appeals; they are not, by
themselves, a cure-all for the problems posed by the courts'
law-making in individual panels, but they effectively comple-
ment other mechanisms that are already in place.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2000).
127 See Fed. R. App. P. 35; see also, e.g., 2nd Cir. R. 35; 4th Cir. R. 35.
12 See, e.g., 7th Cir. R. 40(e); United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1998) (discussing practice in Second Circuit and other courts of appeals).
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i. Rehearing En Banc
In many ways, the rehearing of a case by an en banc panel
is the ultimate device for the promotion of intra-circuit dia-
logue and for the ordered and collective discharge of the court's
law-making function. With all of the circuit's active judges
assembled together, along with any visiting or senior judges
who may have participated in the original panel's decision,
each judge has a full opportunity to explore the nuances of the
case, to ask questions of counsel, to make her views known to
her colleagues, and to engage actively in debating the merits.
En banc review also avoids the problem of litigant-driven law-
making that plagues individual panels: because en banc re-
hearing is a discretionary device, the court is free to withhold
en banc review in cases that are factually or procedurally prob-
lematic and to wait for a case in which an important legal
question is squarely and competently presented.
Yet, while the en banc rehearing is a powerful device for
enabling all circuit judges to have input in setting circuit pre-
cedent, it is not a mechanism without its own flaws. First, it is
quite demanding of time and resources. Not only must judges
depart from their regular sitting schedules to assemble for oral
argument, but the court's entire decision-making process-the
drafting, circulating, commenting upon, and revising of opin-
ions-is significantly complicated and extended by the inclu-
sion of a greater number of participating judges.139 Second,
perhaps in part because of the resources it commands, the en
banc rehearing is, and is likely to remain, an infrequently used
device. While the rate of en banc decisions varies from circuit
to circuit, en banc decisions typically comprise no more than
0.5% of all of adjudications within the federal courts of ap-
peals.14° The courts thus seem committed to the use of en
"' See Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 65, at 43 (explaining that "[blecause
the deliberative process is much more complicated for a [larger] panel . . . . ham-
mering out an en banc opinion is even more difficult and time-consuming than
writing an ordinary panel opinion"); see also Jon 0. Newman, Foreword: In Banc
Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 365,
382 (1984) (discussing the "cumbersome" nature of en banc proceedings);
Carrington, supra note 8, at 582 ("The en banc procedure is . . . time consuming
for the judiciary and burdensome to litigants.").
14 See 1998 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 22, at tbl. S-1 (documenting that
for the year ending in September 1998, there were only eighty-three en banc dis-
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banc review as a kind of ultimate weapon, whose power is to
be kept in reserve for those instances in which its exercise is
most essential.
ii. Circulation of Opinions as a Means of Displacing
Circuit Precedent
Perhaps in recognition of the reality that en banc decisions
are likely to remain uncommon, most of the circuits have de-
veloped an alternative method of enabling circuit precedent to
evolve effectively through collective involvement. In these cir-
cuits, when a panel reaches a decision that conflicts with exist-
ing circuit precedent, the panel may circulate the opinion to
the active members of the court; if the majority do not call for
the court to review the case en banc, the new opinion is per-
mitted to displace previous circuit precedent.' Circulation of
an opinion in accordance with this procedure has many of the
advantages of full en banc consideration: it allows each active
member of the court to participate in the creation of important
circuit precedent and to have her views considered by other
members of the court. Yet it bypasses the most time-consuming
elements of the en banc process, assembly for oral argument
followed by the long process of opinion writing, editing, and
circulation for comment.
Although this method of reconsidering circuit precedent
has significant value as an intra-circuit dialogue-enhancing
device, it too has its drawbacks. First, although each member
of the court has the opportunity to ponder the legal issue posed
by the proposed precedent-displacing opinion, there is reason
to question the amount of attention that each such circulation
will receive. Judges, after all, already bear a heavy load in
resolving the cases assigned to them directly; the amount of
time each can devote to other circuit business, including review
positions out of nearly 25,000 total appeals terminated on the merits); see also
Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing
the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 805, 830-35 (1993) (de-
tailing small (and declining) percentage of cases considered en banc by the courts
of appeals in recent years).
.4 See generally Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceed-
ings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (1986) (reviewing
this practice in the circuit courts).
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of opinions by other panels within the circuit, necessarily is
limited." Second, although judges may have the opportunity
to provide input when an opinion is circulated to the entire
court, they are asked to do so with some fairly significant con-
straints and within the relatively narrow context of a single
case. The judges who did not participate in the panel decision
typically will not have reviewed the parties' briefs or the record
on appeal, and they will not have participated in any oral
argument that might have taken place. They will have little, in
other words, on which to base their decision other than the
panel's proposed opinion, which, if not exactly a fait accompli,
at least carries with it an air of completeness that the other
judges, as latecomers to the case, may be reluctant to up-
set. 14 3
iii. The Role of Unpublished Opinions in Developing
Circuit Precedent
While en banc review and the circulation of precedent-
displacing opinions enhance intra-circuit dialogue to facilitate
the effective development of circuit precedent, each mechanism
carries with it significant limitations. Consequently, while the
use of the unpublished opinion is not the only way of facilitat-
ing the development of precedent in new or complex areas of
the law while enabling intra-court dialogue, unpublished opin-
ions have significant potential to serve as an effective supple-
ment to the en banc hearing and the circulated opinion as dia-
logue-enhancing devices. Where the en banc hearing and the
opinion circulated to the entire court permit the evolution of
circuit precedent within the context of a single case, the un-
published opinion allows the evolution to proceed for a time
across cases and across panels. The reevaluation of prior cir-
cuit decisions by judges who did not participate in those deci-
sions therefore will take place within the context of new facts,
new arguments from the lawyers representing the new parties,
and possibly new precedents from other circuits-enhancements
14 See Stein, supra note 140, at 858-59 (noting that "some jurists hold the
perception that consistent attention to decisions of other panels takes a great deal
of time from a busy judge's own panel duties").
1 See Stein, supra note 140, at 858-59 (noting forces leading to judicial resis-
tance to "meddle" in circulated opinions).
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not available to the original deciding panel that provide con-
textual richness for the evolution of circuit precedent.
d. A Constitutional Coda
This Article's argument that the courts of appeals can and
should use unpublished opinions to avoid the premature estab-
lishment of binding precedent and to promote intra-circuit
dialogue assumes, of course, that such use of unpublished
opinions is properly within the courts' power. That assumption
has been called into question by the Eighth Circuit's recent
opinion in Anastasoff v. United States.'" In Anastasoff, the
appellant, in advancing a position contrary to that taken by a
previous panel in an unpublished opinion, 45 urged that the
court was free to disregard the prior decision because, accord-
ing to the Eighth Circuit's rule, the unpublished decision was
not binding precedent. " 6 In an opinion by Judge Richard Ar-
1" 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.), vacated, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane) [en
bane decision hereinafter Anastasoff III. As the text explains, Judge Arnold's ma-
jority opinion in Anastasoff declared that Eighth Circuit Local Rule 28(A)(i),
treating unpublished opinions as without binding precedential effect, was uncon-
stitutional. After the Eighth Circuit agreed to rehear Anastasoffs appeal en bane,
the parties reached a settlement, rendering the appeal moot. Writing for the en
banc court, Judge Arnold acknowledged that the constitutional status of the court's
rule on unpublished opinions remained of significant interest. See Anastasoff II,
235 F.3d at 1056. In the absence of an active case or controversy, however, he
concluded that the court lacked the authority to consider the issue. See id. The
court therefore vacated its previous ruling, effectively leaving Rule 28(a)(i) un-
touched. Although the panel's decision in Anastasoff itself has no binding
precedential effect, it has already generated scholarly commentary. See Robert C.
Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L.
REv. 1673, 1692 n.72 (2000); John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules
of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 522-24 (2000); Merritt & Brudney, supra note 44,
at 73-74; see also generally Recent Cases: Constitutional Law-Article III Judicial
Power-Eighth Circuit Holds That Unpublished Opinions Must Be Accorded
Precedential Effect, 114 HARV. L. REV. 940 (2001). It also seems extremely likely
that the issues addressed in the opinion, having been raised for the first time,
will soon receive renewed judicial attention.
14" Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375 MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per
curiam) (unpublished).
" Eighth Circuit Rule 28(A)(i) states:
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them. When relevant to establishing the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite
any unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of
this court if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no
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nold, the court asserted that it lacked authority to consider its
prior unpublished decision non-precedential and held that the
Eighth Circuit's rule indicating otherwise was unconstitution-
al." Written in broad and sweeping terms, the Anastasoff
opinion's reasoning and conclusion has the effect not only of
invalidating the Eighth Circuit's rule on unpublished opinions,
but also of calling into doubt those of the other circuits; it
would seem to foreclose not merely the use of unpublished
opinions as a passive virtues device, but also any treatment of
unpublished opinions as other than binding precedent.
Judge Arnold's opinion in Anastasoff is essentially an
originalist argument that the rule of stare decisis was inherent
in the Framers' conception of the "judicial power" delegated to
the courts by Article H." Underlying the Framers' concep-
tion of the judicial power was, he argued, a clear and well-
established view that respect for precedent lay at the heart of
the judicial function. Judge Arnold is not the first to argue
that respect for precedent is an essential part of the Article III
judicial power, 5 ' and it hardly seems outrageous to contend
that precedent plays a role in the judicial function. The issue
remains, however, how rigid that rule must be. While a full
treatment of the extent to which Article III requires courts to
adhere to precedent (and, in turn, to eschew the use of non-
precedential opinions) is beyond the scope of this Article, a
review of the historical sources on which Judge Arnold relies
suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis-the notion that pre-
cedent must be respected in a subsequent case, even if the
court in the later case believes that the precedent was wrongly
decided-was not fully formed at the time the Constitution was
ratified. Indeed, the idea that judges could depart from prece-
dent when reason suggested a different result was foreign to
neither the English nor the American legal systems in the
second half of the eighteenth century. This historical evidence
published opinion of this or another court would serve as well.
8th Cir. R. 28(A)(i).
147 Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900.
148 Id.
... Id. at 901-03.
... See, e.g., William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent, and
Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5, 9-11 (1994); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 754-55 (1988).
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alone suggests that Justice Arnold's sweeping conclusion that
any use of unprecedential opinions necessarily violates Article
II is unwarranted. Moreover, given the significant evolution of
federal court caseloads, and the radically changed institutional
circumstances under which the modern federal courts of ap-
peals operate, a strong case can be made that at least the use
of unpublished opinions in the manner that we describe in this
Article is constitutionally permissible.
i. (Re)examining the History
Judge Arnold begins his analysis in Anastasoff by looking
to the English jurists and legal scholars whose writings in-
formed the Framers' thinking about the judiciary. He begins
with the work of Sir Edward Coke, the seventeenth-century
advocate of judicial independence from the crown. Coke, as
Judge Arnold notes, wrote on a number of occasions that the
role of the judiciary was not to make law but to declare
law. '5 Similarly, Sir William Blackstone, whose COMMENTAR-
IES greatly influenced the founding generation's thinking on
the proper role of the courts,'52 and on whose work Judge Ar-
nold heavily relies, also adhered to this "declaratory" concep-
tion of the law. Blackstone's COMMENTARIES, as Judge Arnold
stresses, emphasized the importance of observing prior court
decisions.'
The "declaratory" conception of the law, however, did not
treat prior decisions as the law itself, but rather as evi-
dence-the best evidence, perhaps, but still merely evidence-of
what the law was."5 While precedent was entitled to respect,
151 See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-01.
112 Sir William Blackstone's COMM,4ENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, pub-
lished between 1765 and 1769, represented a comprehensive effort to rationalize
and summarize the system of English law as it existed in the mid-eighteenth
century. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LE-
GAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 31-32 (1989). First published in the
American Colonies in 1772, it was widely read by the founding generation of the
United States. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 114 (2d
ed. 1985); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 75, 77
(1996).
"3 See Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 901 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAR-
IES at § 69).
1 See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Found-
ing Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 660 (1998).
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in other words, it did not command unquestioned support, and
while a judge was not simply to decide cases based on his own
preferences, neither was he bound to follow precedent that was
contrary to reason.'55 Indeed, Blackstone himself explained
that obedience to precedent was not to be absolute or unthink-
ing. Blackstone recognized that judges do sometimes err, and
he asserted that "where the former determination is most
evidently contrary to reason," judges were not obliged to follow
it, but rather ought properly to "declareD, not that such a sen-
tence was bad law, but that it was not law."'56 In other
words, Blackstone, like Coke, viewed the law as something
beyond the simple amalgamation of precedents; while prior
decisions usually would be compelling evidence of the law,
judges were not bound to follow them in all cases. Blackstone's
COMMENTARIES, moreover, were delivered during a time when
Lord Mansfield-Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 1756 to
1788, and another figure much admired in America-had em-
barked on his ambitious overhaul of England's commercial law,
a process that necessarily emphasized the use of reason to
discern guiding principles over strict adherence to existing
precedent.'5
7
It thus appears that the English approach to precedent in
the second half of the eighteenth century did not amount to a
fully-formed doctrine of stare decisis, but rather it invited
courts to disregard precedent in those cases where it seemed
contrary to reason. This approach seems to have found its way
across the Atlantic. As historian Gordon S. Wood has recently
noted:
American judges in the early Republic interpreted the common law
flexibly in order to mitigate and correct the harm done by the profu-
sion of conflicting statutes passed by unstable democratic legisla-
tures. Judges were often able to play down the importance of prece-
dents and to emphasize instead reason, equity, and convenience in
order to bring the law into accord with changing commercial circum-
stances."5'
155 Id.
I"' 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES § 69-70.
7 See LIEBERMAN, supra note 152, at 126-27; see also Gordon S. Wood, The
Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out
of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 799 (1999).
.. Gordon S. Wood, The Origin of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA.
L. REv. 1421, 1444 (1999).
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Some courts were remarkably up-front in asserting that
they did not consider themselves bound by precedent. In
Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull,"9 for example, the chief justice of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote:
A Court is not bound to give the like judgment, which had been
given by a former Court, unless, they are of opinion that the first
judgment was according to law; for any Court may err; and if a
Judge conceives, that a judgment given by a former Court is errone-
ous, he ought not in conscience to give the like judgment, he being
sworn judge according to law. Acting otherwise would have this
consequence: because one man has been wronged by a judicial deter-
mination, therefore every man, having a like cause, ought to be
wronged also. 6 '
Even those who emphasized the need for courts to pay
heed to prior decisions left room for judicial flexibility. For
example, in his preface to the first volume of the Supreme
Court's official reports for which he served as reporter, William
Cranch stressed the importance of publishing judicial opinions,
arguing that prior decisions represented a check upon judicial
discretion and that publishing those decisions could only en-
hance the effectiveness of that check.' 6' Cranch did not re-
gard precedent as strictly binding, however. A judge, he wrote,
"can not decide a similar case differently, without strong rea-
sons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to make
public."62
The degree to which the "judicial power" entailed respect
for precedent, then, was uncertain at the time the Constitution
was ratified. On the one hand, it seems, courts were expected
to take account of existing precedents; they could not simply
decide each case according to their own whims. On the other,
courts were not compelled to follow precedents that they firmly
believed were wrongly decided, although, were they to depart
from precedent, a reasoned explanation was desirable to en-
sure that judges did not overstep the bounds on their judicial
functions.'63
159 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 175 (Pa. 1786).
,Co Id. at 178.
,' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii (preface) (1804).
16 Id. at iii-iv.
16 See Lee, supra note 154, at 664-66 (describing the attitudes toward prece-
dent in the founding generation).
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What, then, are the implications of the ambiguous histori-
cal conception of the "judicial power" for Judge Arnold's conclu-
sion that the courts of appeals' use of non-precedential unpub-
lished opinions is unconstitutional? With regard to those cir-
cuits that do not permit citation to unpublished opinions,'
Judge Arnold's reasoning would seem to be on relatively solid
ground: the idea that the courts could, a priori, designate a
category of decisions as uncitable and non-precedential would
raise the possibility that the courts would decide such cases in
the unbounded exercise of their discretion. Such decisions,
which have been the focal point of much of the criticism of
unpublished opinions, might appropriately be regarded as
"non-judicial." In those circuits that, like the Eighth Circuit,
permit citation to unpublished opinions,'65 however, Judge
Arnold's criticism seems less apt, though not entirely ground-
less. In these circuits, recall, unpublished opinions may serve
as persuasive authority, though they do not formally bind
subsequent panels. To the degree that subsequent panels may
simply disregard those unpublished opinions that parties bring
to their attention, the court rules that permit such conduct
may be problematic according to the historical sources on
which Judge Arnold relies. If, however, a panel were to respect
the persuasive authority of prior unpublished decisions within
its circuit, and to refuse to follow those decisions only on a
reasoned conclusion that those cases were incorrectly decided,
the panel's course of conduct would seem fully consonant with
the notions of proper judicial conduct current in the late eigh-
teenth century.
ii. Responding to Modernity
Whatever the merits or demerits of originalism as a consti-
tutional interpretive philosophy, it surely should not serve as
the basis of a decision where reference to the founding
generation's interpretation of the relevant constitutional text
fails to yield clear guidance. This is particularly so where the
institution concerning which originalist guidance is sought has
been greatly transformed by the demands of a growing nation
16 See supra note 46.
' See supra note 46 and text accompanying note 133.
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and a more complex society. Although a review of historical
sources suggests some uncertainty about the Framers' concep-
tion of the judicial power, it is certain that their conception of
federal courts was nothing like what exists today. The original
judicial structure established by the Constitution seemed to
contemplate at least the possibility of Supreme Court justices
alone handling all federal judicial responsibilities. Article II
vests the judicial power in "one Supreme Court, and such infe-
rior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.""'6 To the extent the Founders envisioned "inferior
courts," they could scarcely imagine the possibility that each
year well over 600 district judges would have to tackle more
than 300,000 federal case filings and that nearly 200 circuit
judges would have to confront over 50,000 appeals. 67
The reality of these sheer numbers-together with the
federal judicial structure that has developed to handle insti-
tutionally this massive caseload-weighs against narrow adher-
ence to originalist arguments, especially when the originalist
sources provide no clear answer. When the possible number of
cases and number of judges addressing an issue expands from
a handful to hundreds, the notion that a judge should be
bound because another judge previously has addressed a legal
issue becomes less tenable. Indeed, this is a conceded and
established fact in the work of federal district courts, wherein
the decision by a district judge is understood to have no bind-
ing precedential force even for future cases arising in the same
district.6 ' In this context, and given the fact that an appel-
late panel that decides an issue represents only a small minor-
ity of the active judges in the circuit,'69 it hardly seems un-
reasonable to suggest that the courts might adopt a procedure
that would permit a panel to state its conclusion tentatively
until other members of the court had an opportunity to exam-
ine the issue. This is not to say that the modern realities of
caseload and federal judging serve to reduce the concept of
precedent to a nullity either as a matter of principle or as a
matter of constitutional law. But in light of the dramatic ex-
'" U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
16 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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pansion of the federal docket, and the concomitant increase in
the federal judiciary, an adjustment to rigid notions of prece-
dent that would enhance judicial dialogue and improve the
appellate courts' ability to exercise their law-making function
seems both constitutionally permissible and conceptually
sound.
CONCLUSION
Effectively bringing a form of Alexander Bickel's "passive
virtues" to the federal courts of appeals will not magically
resolve all the challenges that circuit courts must confront in
trying to balance concerns of efficiency and justice in the face
of an enormous increase in the number of cases they must
resolve each year. Judges and scholars have been discussing
and debating the response of the federal courts of appeals to
rising caseloads for at least thirty years, and we neither expect
nor hope our suggestions will cease such an important and
valuable dialogue.
However, we do believe that too much of this discussion
has gone forward without taking full account of the unique
features that structure and affect the workings and the work
product of the federal appellate courts. Consequently, assess-
ments of the current state of affairs, and prescriptions for the
future, have failed to be fully attentive to the special challeng-
es to effective decision-making in the federal courts of appeals.
Our primary contention is that certain fundamental, but often
overlooked, institutional features of the modern federal circuit
courts significantly affect the balance between efficiency and
justice in appellate decision-making, and that the dialogue
about court reforms must be recast to take full account of these
institutional realities. We also believe that our suggested mod-
el for federal circuit court decision-making-a model which
draws upon the "passive virtues" ideas first developed by
Bickel-is more attentive and responsive to the modern dy-
namics of the federal courts of appeals. We thus do expect and
hope that this Article can and will effectively inform the on-
going debates.
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